Desk Review on Resilience Building and Self-Sufficiency among Refugees and Host Communities in CRRF Countries

With special focus on Turkana and Garissa Counties, Kenya

Rahul Oka and Rieti Gengo

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Executive Summary

The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and the Global Compact on Refugees represent a new paradigm in both thought and action on actor and stakeholder response to the current global refugee crises: in particular, on protracted encampment. Host nations and the international aid and development communities have increased their attention to resilience and self-sufficiency of refugees and host communities as a means of easing the pressures on host governments while enabling refugees to live lives of dignity and fulfillment and pursue upward social and economic mobility. This literature review assesses the state of resilience and self-sufficiency initiatives within protracted refugee settings and host communities, highlighting successes, gaps, and recommendations for more effective programming and policy.

Progress in CRRF Implementation and Refugee–Host Integration, Resilience, and Self-Sufficiency

1. There have been significant national level developments and movements as host nations move toward changing their legal and infrastructural systems aimed at reducing their own burdens through helping refugees integrate into host communities as self-sufficient partners in development.

2. These national-level developments, however, face significant local and regional barriers to successful implementation in all host nations due to the political and sociocultural complexity of refugee–host interactions within a continuing relief paradigm, where even after the official removal or closure of camps in favor of integrated settlements, the bulk of the refugees and host communities are projected to require external relief.

3. There has been significant increase in public–private–NGO partnerships in developing models to enhance refugee and host self-reliance in host nations. For example, private companies and development-focused firms such as Sanivation are working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other partners to utilize market-oriented models to enhance water, sanitation, and hygiene (better latrines and harvesting of human waste) and fuel efficiency (briquettes from human waste for environmentally friendly cooking fuel to replace firewood and charcoal). The aims are to scale up production of these briquettes by refugees and hosts to eventually be sold for profit in local and regional markets. Financial service groups such as Equity Bank in Kenya and Mastercard (worldwide) have partnered with relief agencies to enhance refugee and host community access to loans, credit, and financial education. These approaches include workshops in financial literacy and money management and improved face-to-face, personal, and electronic banking services in refugee hosting areas. However, these programs are all in the pilot phases and have yet to be scaled up for meaningful and significant impacts on larger populations.

4. Multiple studies and reports have been produced using mixed methods approaches to measure the pathways to self-reliance and self-sufficiency among refugees and host communities and to evaluate the impact of external interventions. These studies and reports identify key gaps in infrastructure in refugee hosting areas, including low/varying levels of market penetration; poor health services; incipient and enduring cultural, political, economic, and gendered inequities; dominance of subsistence-level agriculture/pastoralism;
deep communication gaps and lack of coordination between and within stakeholders (agendas and working infrastructure of donors, relief agencies, development groups, host nation political and economic elites, and local communities); and an over-reliance on traditional approaches (livelihoods and skills training), all of which work against the legal and economic definitions of enabling environments by creating restrictions on mobility and access to jobs, opportunities, markets, and credit/capital.

**Gaps in CRRF Implementation and Refugee-Host Integration, Resilience, and Self-Sufficiency**

1. Most of these studies are commissioned by agencies for their own programming purposes, follow traditional data collection and analysis tools, and tend to overlap significantly, leading to redundancy in both data and analysis. They are also siloed, largely dictated by the programming priorities of the commissioning agencies, with little impact on supra-agency programming.

2. Most policy recommendations tend to be general and focus on better partner coordination; improved communication; increased attention to inequities; increased access to resources and markets; building self-reliance through capacity-building or skills enhancement/education; market stimulation; and/or revised gender dynamics.

3. Most advances in legal implementation of the CRRF framework built around easing restrictions on mobility and access to employment and socioeconomic opportunities, including markets, education, health, and capital/credit, are fairly recent, and hence these studies have not been able to analyze the impacts of these changes. Most implementation approaches have comprised pilot projects aimed at enhancement of economic skills and opportunities and financial inclusion of all groups, especially women, but have largely ignored (or are unconcerned with) financial commitment to providing the transformative infrastructures necessary to scale up, sustain, and grow these interventions beyond their project-funding cycles.

4. In host countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, where these restrictions are legally absent, both the continuing influx of refugees and the disabling environments where most camps are located have strained the resources of relief organizations and have led to limited self-sufficiency and resilience for most refugees with lower social capital who remain relief dependent and for hosts who remain marginalized. The refugees who move to urban areas (Kigali, Kampala) or even Nairobi (despite the disabling legal environment) tend to do better than their compatriots in the camps because of the higher social capital that enabled and sustained their move to urban areas in the first place.

Following from the examples of Rwanda and Uganda and from the overall synthesis of the studies and approaches in the desk review, there is insufficient analysis of non-economic sources of resilience and, by extension, of self-sufficiency as identified by USAID (2018) and how these factors intersect and manifest in local political economies. Most studies and implementation approaches focus on addressing:

- Financial inclusion—primarily focusing on formal financial systems and ignoring the larger role of inclusion in social-cultural financial networks that are more potentially available to broader sections of targeted beneficiaries.
• Women’s empowerment and gender inequality without addressing the underlying ideological and cultural beliefs and behaviors and assuming that women’s empowerment as a goal will be readily and painlessly acceptable to local stakeholders through small interventions and training workshops.
• Diversification of livelihood risk without understanding the gendered nature of labor, work, and subsistence in these areas, especially in areas with poor infrastructure where high-status jobs (pastoralism, clerical work, large businesses) are seen as men’s occupations while subsistence-level jobs (kitchen gardens and plot-based agriculture, small trade and manufacturing activities) are seen as female occupations.
• Access to markets without addressing the broader range of non-market exchange systems in these areas.

While some studies (e.g., Betts et al. 2018a) have addressed social capital through qualitative data on social support networks, social capital was largely unexplored in both the studies as well as approaches as a key factor for understanding resilience. When referred to, social capital was viewed as a supplement to economic factors such as jobs and financial inclusion. This is troubling, as the local political economies and the systems of kin-based inclusion, nepotism, and corruption flow through social networks and access to jobs, markets, capital, and women’s empowerment are largely products of social networks. Another troubling gap in these studies and approaches is superficial attention given to the short- and long-term impacts of psychobiological manifestations of psychosocial stressors and systemic shocks that have a negative effect on key sources of resilience, such as personal aspirations, self-efficacy, and confidence to adapt. Most telling, these studies and approaches—while amassing vast amounts of data—rarely speak to the complex intersections of economic factors with the broader issues of gender inequity; the political economy, including graft, corruption, nepotism, cultural traditions, and behaviors; and the physiological and psychobiological health processes that affect the studied and sought economic well-being outcomes.

Recommendations for More Effective CRRF Implementation and Refugee-Host Integration, Resilience, and Self-Sufficiency

1. The perceived limitations of self-reliance and self-sufficiency often attributed to “dependency syndrome” (pathological reliance on relief) and the “refugee mentality” (laziness and lethargy of refugees attributed to relief dependency) need to be reassessed and linked to the actual complexities of refugee and host community lives—in particular, the dynamic hierarchies, social support systems, and the interface of protracted encampment, health, cultural behaviors, social economies, and resilience that affect refugee responses to interventions and other programming.
2. The concept of resilience as a way to absorb, adapt to, and transform the individual, group, and community in response/anticipation to scales of stressors and shocks needs to be rethought in the context of refugee and host community lives, where stressors and shocks are the norm.
3. Cultural ideas of resilience, exchange, and interactions; local modes of self-reliance; and histories of refugee and host conflict, as well as their intersections with their host/own governments and external interventions should be included in any policy recommendation, which would require a different mode of data collection and engagement with local stakeholders.
4. Academic work on self-sufficiency and resilience of pastoralists living in highly stressed and volatile physical and socioeconomic political environments with high frequency of environmental and socioeconomic shocks suggests that external interventions following traditional modalities based on market stimulation/participation, education, and skills development to enhance self-reliance often tend to be disruptive and negatively affect resilience and self-reliance, due to attrition, drop-outs, the generation of new hierarchies, and failures of programs, in both the pilot and scaling phases.

5. Meta-analysis of all data gathered through big data and thick data approaches should be considered. Meta-analysis of big data approaches can combine various quantitative data sets obtained by different studies to examine correlations between different variables and factors. Meta-analysis of thick data can combine the narrative data sets from key informant and individual structured or semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, along with participant observations, to examine cultural domains, consensus, differences, and underlying agendas, motivations, and actions of stakeholders and beneficiaries. The combined synthesis of big and thick data meta-analyses will give descriptive, explanatory, and even predictive frameworks that can help multiple donors, agencies, and other stakeholders in identifying infrastructural gaps, unmet needs, and projected growth potential, as well as structural barriers to programming success.

6. Policy recommendations should include pathways for locally feasible implementation, which comprise locally specific and data-backed suggestions on the precise steps that local and regional policymakers can take to improve outcomes. While these might not be immediately scalable or even transferable, such suggestions have the potential of vastly improving program outcomes at the local level and are of immediate benefits to beneficiaries.
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<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-Arid Lands</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CIPD</td>
<td>County Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<td>DRDIP</td>
<td>Development Response to Displacement Impacts Projects</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FFA</td>
<td>Food Assistance for Assets</td>
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<td>GOK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IHRC</td>
<td>International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard University</td>
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<tr>
<td>iNGO</td>
<td>International Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KISEDIP</td>
<td>Kalobeyi Integrated Social and Economic Development Program</td>
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<td>MIRPS</td>
<td>Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y Soluciones</td>
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<tr>
<td>nNGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration</td>
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<td>ReHoPE</td>
<td>Refugee and Host Population Empowerment Strategy</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SSAR+</td>
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<td>SWOT/B</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats/Barriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKAID</td>
<td>United Kingdom Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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I. Introduction

Background

The emerging consensus that refugees and migrants are entitled to live self-sufficient lives of safety and dignity during their flight or exile, initially guaranteed in the 1951 Refugee Convention, has been formalized by the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the development of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). This approach shifts all concerned actors and stakeholders away from the currently dominant paradigm of protracted and restricted encampment toward inclusion and integration of refugees into their host communities through partnerships between host and donor nations, humanitarian organizations, the private sector, and refugee and host communities. This is considered a more durable, sustainable, and dignified remedy to protracted encampment. Subsequently, many emerging interventions are being planned and executed through private–public–NGO partnerships around enhancing refugee self-sufficiency (also known as self-reliance) by building skills, investing in refugee and host entrepreneurial activities, and creating opportunities through increased access to education, employment, capital, and markets. These interventions are usually informed through massive data collection and analytical projects undertaken by the partnered groups and focus largely on understanding existing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats/barriers (SWOT/B) to economic self-sufficiency among refugees and their host communities.

The Problem

There is a large gap in our understanding of the complexity of the ways in which the diversity of personal circumstances or the non-economic and psychosocial aspects specific to refugees' (and host communities') well-being may affect pathways to refugee and host community self-sufficiency. Economic self-sufficiency is embedded within larger intersecting social, cultural, political, medical, and environmental systems of adaptation and resilience that shape and, in turn, are shaped by economic activities. These include:

- Different cultural models of exchange and reciprocity
- Refugee and host community interactions
- Socio-political inclusion/exclusion of both groups within the broader host society
- Frequency and intensity of, and responses to, socio-environmental shocks and stressors
- Social support networks before and during encampment
- Consistency of public health and psychosocial support delivery systems within these environments

These are just a few of the factors that inform the resilience capabilities of peoples living in restrictive, marginalized, and environmentally harsh conditions; these are often mentioned but not rigorously mapped within most current approaches. This gap in understanding of the effect of personal circumstances on the refugee experience in turn forms a barrier to feasible, actionable, and implementable policy at local, regional, and national/global levels.
Why This Study?

The purpose of this study is to analyze and understand better the intersection and potential relationships between economic and non-economic factors that contribute to self-sufficiency (health, social support networks, refugee-host interactions, etc.). This analysis will enable a closer introspection of the correlation between non-economic and economic factors that shape both refugee/host resilience and pathways/barriers to self-sufficiency. Specifically, the findings will help identify silos and barriers in coordination and communication between donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State Bureau for Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), relief agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implementing partners including private and corporate organizations, local host governments, and the refugee and host communities. By uncovering the complex intersections between the variable impacts of forced displacement, protracted encampment in harsh restricted landscapes on the sustaining capacities of donors, relief and implementing agencies, and refugee and host communities, this study will potentially identify the major gaps in ongoing and planned programming. In so doing, the analysis will potentially inform locally feasible and regionally applicable policy recommendations leading to the development of new intervention models or modifications of current models in culturally appropriate and economically/politically sustainable modes.

Why Focus on Kenya?

In November 2014, UNHCR Kenya, in partnership with the World Bank and other stakeholders, organized a workshop in Lodwar, Turkana County, Kenya, to discuss alternative approaches to protracted refugee encampment, with a particular focus on Kakuma Refugee Camp in West Turkana District, Turkana County. This workshop emerged from a longstanding consensus and understanding that the dominant paradigm of protracted encampment was undesirable and unsustainable for all stakeholders: host governments, host communities, donor and relief organizations, and the refugee communities. The workshop also led to the joint Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Program (KISEDP) at the village of Kalobeyei, located 12 kilometers from Kakuma Camp/Town, in partnership between UNHCR, World Bank, the Government of Kenya (GOK), and the Turkana County Governor’s Office. The Kalobeyei settlement represents an attempt to build a resilient and self-reliant/sufficient integrated refugee–host community with bidirectional utility of both groups’ skills, capital, motivations, and actions.

The data from Kakuma presented during this workshop shed light on Kakuma refugees' various attempts to take control of their own lives through agentive intersections involving better consumption choice and preferences with the commercial economies and local markets and refugee–host interactions, as well as the complex nature of relationships with their Turkana hosts. The discussions led to the World Bank and UNHCR forming partnerships with academic researchers from the University of Notre Dame and the University of Wisconsin-Madison (United States) and the University of South Wales (Australia). These studies (Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; Gengo et al., 2017; Sanghi et al., 2016, Vemuru et al., 2016) combined various approaches (economic, ethnography, psycho-social, and anthropometric surveys) that covered the economic, social, political, and health impacts of refugees in Kakuma Refugee Camp on the Turkana host community. The findings from the combined studies suggested that Kakuma refugees had a net positive economic, social, and health impact on the Turkana host community living around the camp. The findings also called attention to the complex nature of refugee–host social relationships that ranged from violence and simmering tension to friendship and marital alliances.
economic exchanges where host communities found employment and trading opportunities with the refugees. The results gave strength to a variation in the official UNHCR refugee self-reliance paradigm to move away from a focus on refugees toward a humanitarian-development nexus that integrates refugee and host community social-economies, i.e., KISEDP.

Since 2016, a multitude of studies by various relief and other development organizations have been conducted in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, with key studies being conducted by:

- Kimetrica-UNHCR-WFP (2016)
- WFP and the Refugee Studies Center (RSC), University of Oxford (Betts et al., 2018a, 2018b, 2019)
- Samuel Hall/Danish Refugee Council (DRC) (2016)
- International Financial Corporation (2017)
- International Rescue Committee (IRC) (2018)
- Norwegian Refugee Council with the International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard University (NRC-IHRC) (2018)

These studies have primarily focused on economic pathways to understanding refugee and host community states of self-sufficiency and resilience, using multiple approaches, including intensive surveys, key informant and respondent interviews, focus group discussions, and reviews of current literature. The total number of informants surveyed and interviewed throughout these studies runs into the thousands, with most studies concluding that significant barriers to building refugee and host community resilience and self-sufficiency in Kenya lie primarily in:

1. Restrictions on refugee residence, mobility, and employment
2. Lack of refugee access to capital, property ownership, and labor markets
3. Uneven market penetration and infrastructure making the transfer/up-scaling of market stimulation and other market-oriented modalities difficult
4. Lack of communication and engagement between external stakeholders (NGOs, relief organizations) and local stakeholders (refugees and hosts)
5. Harsh environmental and social constraints on all residents of Turkana County and other arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) in Northern Kenya

There is, hence, an overwhelming amount of data, the bulk of which has explored the economic pathways and barriers to self-sufficiency and resilience in Kakuma and Kalobeyei. In comparison, there has been very little recent work done in Dadaab due to security concerns, apart from a recent NRC household survey assessing multisector needs (Reach-NRC, 2019) and a study on material safety (IRC, 2018). Additional specialized studies on Dadaab include a legal analysis of the implications of unilateral closure of Dadaab (Thompson Reuters, 2017), a case study on Accelerated Education in Dadaab (AEWG-NRC, 2017), and a report on the state of Somali returnees between 2016 and 2017 (DDG-UKAID, 2017). Most comprehensive work on economic activities in Dadaab predates the year 2015, focusing primarily on livelihoods and opportunities (DRC-UNHCR, 2013) and a comparative study of market structure and access in Kakuma and Dadaab (WFP, 2014a). In July 2019, the Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Program (GISEDP) was initiated as a dialogue between the County Government of Garissa, the Government of Kenya (GOK), UNHCR, WFP, and other relief and
development agencies. The aim of GISEDP is to generate a development framework for both refugees and hosts in Garissa County that, once ratified by the county and GOK, will bring Dadaab in line with CRRF objectives.

Kakuma is now seen as an exemplar of a successful entrepreneurial and bustling refugee camp accommodating and positively impacting both the refugee and host community. This shifting perspective and the resulting experimental settlement of Kalobeyei (KISEDP) have taken place within—and likely also shaped—a broader global shift in relief and development organizations and governments’ approach to protracted refugee situations: a new agreement signed by 173 United Nation (UN) member nations (the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants). This agreement was followed by the CRRF, with the goals of refugee and migrant self-sufficiency; safe, sustainable, and dignified integration (including gainful employment) within host nations and communities; third-country resettlement; or repatriation while easing the burden on host nations.

It is noted that while the rights of refugees and migrants to seek and maintain gainful employment or other livelihood activities in host nations while waiting for case resolution is written into the 1951 Refugee Convention, most signatory nations have highly restrictive laws governing both refugee settlement and access to education, employment, and markets. These restrictions continue despite these countries’ agreement to both the 1951 Convention and the CRRF in 2016. As such, there are significant barriers to successful policy implementation aimed at enhancing refugee self-sufficiency and resilience. Apart from general recommendations urging the easing of such restrictions and improved access to health, education, labor, and markets, there is an emerging consensus that any attempt to build refugee self-sufficiency and resilience needs to:

1. Proceed through partnerships between relief and development organizations, host and donor nations/bodies, and private organizations.
2. Include and engage with both refugee and host communities as a co-created process.
3. Operate within the legal framework of the host nation, despite the restrictions.

In other words, while organizations and donor bodies can continue to work with host governments to ease restrictions, external interventions need to operate within the legal limits set by the host nation.

Apart from these restrictions, there is also the problem of translating the vast amount of data gathered and analyzed into meaningful and implementable policy, especially from the viewpoint of donor nations. First, most of these studies are commissioned by different relief and development groups or donor organizations/nations and hence may have differing agendas and follow different methodologies for data collection, particularly in terms of the research questions asked and the survey instruments used. Second, these differing agendas and methodologies can lead to different conclusions, but more important, they prevent complementarity of data and thus rigorous meta-analysis that could yield policy recommendations that are more locally applicable, regionally feasible, and nationally appropriate. Third, and most important, while most of these studies mention psycho-social and physical well-being, nutritional security, and social networks as important factors affecting refugee and host community resilience and self-sufficiency, very few have systematically collected and analyzed these data and merged it with socioeconomic data in a systematic or rigorous fashion (exceptions being Gengo et al., 2017; Sanghi et al., 2016; and Vemuru et al., 2016).
These data are crucial, given the emerging focus on the intersections between psycho-social and physical health and sociality and the impacts of these intersections on self-sufficiency and resilience. These findings and analyses stand in direct opposition to the “refugee mentality/dependency syndrome,” where years of dependency on aid lead to refugee avoidance of opportunities or incentives for bettering their lives and moving toward self-sufficiency. Dependency syndrome is used to explain high levels of attrition and lack of engagement with past and ongoing livelihood and other capacity-building programming but (ironically) coexists with the counter-belief driving self-reliance programming: that entrepreneurial refugees do possess the innovative drive and abilities to become self-sufficient. Both of these narratives have major problems when examined closely:

1. The entrepreneurial refugee success narrative is based on a few entrepreneurs building thriving businesses in refugee camps. This drives much current programming aimed to reproduce such entrepreneurship in other refugees, enabling them to generate self-sufficient lives for themselves without the need for relief. This vision hides a more complex system of structural and historical inequalities wherein the entrepreneurial refugees seen as models for emulation possess significant social and other forms of capital prior to and during displacement/encampment in terms of skills, connections, and other forms of social and economic support, whereas other refugees do not possess these. Most refugees cannot replicate the success of the entrepreneurial few (Omata, 2017; Oka, 2014).

2. Attempts by most refugees to engage with livelihood and other opportunities and incentive programming often end in attrition and failure. These failures are then attributed to the laziness and lethargy of the “refugee mentality” and, in turn, the “dependency syndrome.” However, emerging research suggests that this refugee mentality/dependency syndrome might actually be an effect of untreated trauma from forced displacement and other shocks and the stressors from protracted encampment with limited access to health services. These are correlated with a) chronic inflammation, compromised immunity, neurological and cardiovascular function, and depression and other mental conditions, and b) have a significant and negative impact on the person’s ability to respond to incentives or to opportunities, especially for those without the mitigating or even enhancing effect of social support networks (Chun-Hong et al., 2019; Gengo, 2019; Panter-Brick et al., 2019; Treadway et al., 2019).

**CRRF Implementation Progress**

UNHCR has completed comprehensive reviews of the 15 refugee hosting nation-states primarily in the Americas and Africa that have “opted to apply the CRRF and related concepts,” seeking to assess progress and impacts of CRRF implementation across objectives (UNHCR, 2018). A detailed review of these findings—along with a critical analysis of CRRF implementation in Africa and, specifically, in Kenya—is provided in Annex 1. The principal conclusions of these studies are presented below:

1. Leveraging new financing approaches and instruments is essential in opening up more sustainable and effective funding for both developmental and humanitarian responses in support of both refugees and host communities—and to enhance host governments’ existing support to refugees.
2. A “whole of society” approach, as reflected in the CRRF, requires an investment of time and leadership by host governments to bring together diverse stakeholders and build a shared understanding. Factors such as leadership and political commitment from the highest levels of government, openness to policy reform, and international and multilateral agencies’ commitment to new ways of working all contribute to a contextually appropriate realization of CRRF.

3. There is a growing recognition of the potential social and economic contributions refugees can make in their host countries, when permitted to do so. A more inclusive policy and legal approach by host states, supported by increased investment by development actors, can generate development gains in key sustainable development goals (SDGs) for host communities as well as refugees.

4. Against a 15-year trend of gradual and consistent increases in the numbers of individuals resettled (with annual fluctuations), 2017 and 2018 saw resettlement rates contract to a level slightly below the previous decade’s average. As part of the global commitment to more equitable and predictable responsibility-sharing in the New York Declaration, member states expressed an intention to provide resettlement places and other legal pathways for admission on a scale to meet the annual needs identified by UNHCR. In this regard, the Emerging Resettlement Countries Joint Support Mechanism and the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative are important efforts seeking to expand not only the base of countries participating in resettlement schemes but also the pathways and number of places available. Data on access to and use of complementary pathways is limited and needs to be strengthened.

5. Addressing the root causes of forced displacement, including peacebuilding in countries of origin, represent the key challenge toward achieving Objective Four of the CRRF. This requires political investment and enhanced stabilization and development efforts from regional and international actors. Although limited voluntary returns occurred from 2016 to 2018 in CRRF countries, regional approaches to drivers of displacement and instability—such as the Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y Soluciones (MIRPS, or Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework) in Central America and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Nairobi Declaration and Plan of Action on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees—are crucial in accelerating solutions in countries of origin.

6. There is evidence that greater focus on local as well as national structures would increase the effectiveness of the CRRF. Evidence from Kenya and Uganda demonstrate that local government structures play an important role in coordinating and leading refugee responses. For example, the Turkana County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) 2013–2017 highlights the leadership role of local authorities in incorporating refugees in local planning.

In addition to UNHCR’s own research, significant investment has been made in program evaluations and academic research to identify, understand, and replicate effective approaches to achieve CRRF objectives. A review of these studies are presented in the following sections.
2. Interventions and Approaches

A significant amount of work has been conducted by different agencies and research teams to explore pathways toward resilience and self-sufficiency in the context of refugees and displaced persons. Thousands of informants have been surveyed and interviewed, and extensive amounts of both qualitative and quantitative data have been gathered. This desk review focuses on studies (listed in Table 1) conducted within the East Africa context, paying increased attention to studies in Kenya (given the overarching objectives of this research) and studies in Rwanda and Uganda (given the progressive approaches to refugee hosting in these countries that predate the CRRF model). The most significant finding of this desk review is that the majority of these studies pursue similar questions and report similar findings and recommendations. Table 2, on the following page, provides a summary of the most prevalent and reoccurring questions being asked in these regional studies, along with each question’s most common findings and recommendations. Generally, these studies focus on approaches to improve economic inclusion and enhance income-generating opportunities and use economic metrics to draw conclusions and develop recommendations.

Table 1. Studies of Past Programming Approaches in East Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Title</th>
<th>Study Implementer</th>
<th>Country of Focus</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Inclusion of Refugees and Host Communities in Rwanda Project (2019)</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Assessment: Towards a Market-Based Food Assistance to Refugees: Rwanda (2014)</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Subsistence to Rebuilding: An Internal Evaluation of Large Cash Transfers to Refugee and Host Communities in Uganda (2008)</td>
<td>GiveDirectly</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Assessment of Uganda’s Progressive Approach to Refugee Management (2016)</td>
<td>UNHCR and The World Bank</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Questions</td>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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| **What are effective strategies for socioeconomic inclusion of refugees, and what impact does socioeconomic inclusion have on refugee self-sufficiency?** | - Refugee economic integration is a long process.  
- Host and refugee communities are best suited to identify priorities for socioeconomic integration; citizen engagement/feedback is key.  
- Access to capital and financial services is crucial to successful integration.  
- Strategic investments are necessary to develop markets and increase refugee integration (i.e., roads, post-production facilities, etc.). | - Develop businesses/services for which the demand is already in place  
- Focus on specific refugee and host community, and tailor interventions to specific contexts  
- Facilitate access to markets for female and young entrepreneurs in refugee populations  
- Provide access to financial services |
| **What are effective strategies for increasing refugees’ economic opportunities?** | - Strategies cannot be designed from the outside.  
- Refugees face significant regulatory obstacles.  
- Women are especially vulnerable and less likely to have/find income-generating opportunities.  
- Access to financial and human capital are strong predictors of economic outcomes.  
- The agriculture sector dominates the majority of (if not all) hosting districts.  
- Most small and micro-enterprises lack business planning and bookkeeping skills. | - Eliminate regulatory barriers such as restricted mobility and access to IDs  
- Development responses need to be more gendered, with consideration for the poorest and least skilled  
- Invest in human capital; link vocational training to labor market needs  
- Invest in farming and livestock rearing |
| **What economic and social impacts do refugees have on host communities?** | - Many vibrant informal markets between refugees and host communities already exist.  
- Non-tradable sectors like education and health benefit from refugee presence more than tradable sectors.  
- Refugee presence can either incentivize more agricultural production or serve as competition.  
- Hosting groups that are most similar to refugees are more likely to be negatively affected by substitution effects, and groups that are different than refugees are more likely to benefit from complementary effects.  
- Risk of conflict increases when host communities must share resources and market access with greater numbers of people while refugees receive emergency support funds.  
- Refugee presence can cause inflation on local prices where markets are not well integrated. | - Identify gaps and demands within the existing informal economy to develop locally appropriate opportunities for training, employment, and value chain development  
- Focus on peacebuilding; emphasize commonalities/mutual benefits  
- Monitor social tensions  
- Increase agency engagement with host communities (for trust/ transparency)  
- Increase focus on development projects that address host community needs  
- Design programs in collaboration with local host governments to ensure local political backing  
- Utilize and build the capacity of local agricultural producers to respond to increased food demand |
| **What are effective strategies for implementing voucher- and cash-based relief programs, and what impact have these programs had on refugee self-sufficiency?** | - Voucher-based programs struggle when users are restricted in where they can use vouchers.  
- Voucher-based programs present logistics challenges (such as card replacement).  
- When voucher diversion occurs, the cash is typically used for essential non-food items such as bedding, utensils, medicines, schooling, etc.  
- Delivering large, unrestricted cash transfers to refugee and host communities has proven operationally feasible and efficient.  
- The flexibility of cash allows recipients to adapt and respond to shocks and instability.  
- Cash programs cause increased incomes, improved relations within and between host and refugee communities, and increased business for retailers and commercial entities. | - Unrestricted cash transfer modalities are preferable where there is an active market penetration  
- Make voucher programs as unrestrictive as possible, increasing consumer choice and ease of use  
- Consider voucher- or cash-based programs for host communities as well as refugee communities |
Regional Findings from East Africa

A clear, overarching theme emerging from Table 2 is that self-sufficiency, resilience, and integration efforts face significant challenges in contexts that lack enabling environments. The barriers to self-sufficiency and resilience are more predictable in the Kenyan context, influenced by legal restrictions on refugee freedom of movement and rights to seek employment, than in the Rwandan and Ugandan contexts. Rwanda and (especially historically) Uganda have had the least restrictive policies on refugee rights to mobility, residence, employment, business activities, and all other rights enjoyed by the citizens of these countries in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention and their own legal systems. As signatory to the 1951 Convention, the Government of Rwanda ensures the rights of work and primary education and the right to move freely and is currently working on improving refugee access to markets, capital, and other opportunities.

However, despite these progressive legal changes, there are many gaps, especially in areas where refugees are concentrated, that tend to be underdeveloped, with limited market penetration and both refugee and host communities living at or near the subsistence level. According to The World Bank (2019), in Rwanda the success of market modalities were largely limited to camps in areas with existing market infrastructure. Hence, while market-centered interventions were considered feasible in the Nyabihike, Gihenbe, and Kigeme camps, the Kiziba and Mugombwa camps lacked the infrastructure to sustain external interventions. This is in line with other studies that suggest the need for pre-existing infrastructure for interventions, thereby limiting market modalities to local realities. The World Bank assessment of the potential for refugee inclusion in national development plans concluded that while feasible, massive infrastructural support was needed from external bodies and the Rwandan Government to implement meaningful and sustainable inclusion. Specifically, the report suggested embedding of responses within institutional systems of governance and finance, clear communication and coordination between local, regional, and all concerned actors in implementing multi-sectorial projects, and adequate review of works design and plans by local and national agencies.

In Uganda, the legal system governing refugee rights has been more extensively studied (see Betts et al., 2014, 2017; Clements et al., 2016; Ilcan, 2018; Ilcan et al., 2017; UNHCR-World Bank, 2016). The Uganda model allows refugees to seek employment, business, agriculture, and other sustenance activities and the freedom to settle anywhere in the country. Uganda and Rwanda have hence a demonstrable lead in establishing alternative models for refugee–host community integration granting the aforementioned rights as well as access to government-provided health care and primary education. The more progressive approach to refugees has long been studied as a model for other host nations, in particular with the Settlement Transformative Agenda and the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategy that focuses on building refugee and host community self-reliance. The UNHCR-World Bank review of the ReHoPE strategy (2016) identified barriers around access to secondary education and access to gainful employment for refugees with disabilities. The key recommendations were:

- Oversight is required so that refugees can better coordinate and collaborate with host communities on economic activities.
- The ReHoPE strategy offers an opportunity to design a developmental approach that builds on past achievements and addresses challenges related to the Self Reliance Strategy and Development Assistance to Refugee-Hosting Areas program.
• Programming should be informed by a deeper situational analysis of the nine refugee-hosting districts where the Settlement Transformative Agenda and ReHoPE will be implemented.

Interventions have also produced some increase in access to education for refugees after the Government of Uganda launched the Education Response Plan in 2018, which outlines the steps and investment required for including an estimated 675,000 children into the country’s education structure.

While the UNHCR-World Bank Report did not focus on host communities, these findings are supplemented by a more recent study by FAO (2018) on food security, resilience, and well-being among refugees and hosts in Northern Uganda. Key findings were that commonalities between refugees and host communities provide a strong foundation for peaceful coexistence and development, that refugees’ integration into the local formal economy is a long process, and that displacement and refugees’ arrival create opportunities for operating business enterprises. The study found that a vibrant informal market already exists between refugees and host communities, contributing to the resilience of both communities. However, refugee households are less resilient than households living in host communities, due to the uncertainty of refugee lives, and the resilience of households in the host communities is mainly threatened by natural forces. The study also found a primary source of destabilization was potential conflict between hosts and refugees, especially when the refugees receive relief aid during emergencies that are denied to hosts, even when they face the same shocks. Another source of conflict is access to education and employment opportunities that favor refugees over host communities (FAO, 2018).

**Findings from the Kenyan Context**

In addition to the summary of regional findings and recommendations presented in Table 2 and discussed above, the following sections provide in-depth discussions of the reports and evaluations specifically focused on refugee camps in Kenya’s Turkana and Garissa counties. These studies, listed in Table 3, below, pursued objectives in line with the larger collection of reports, focusing on pathways to economic autonomy through market integration, workforce development, and private investment. Overall, in addition to legal restrictions to movement and employment, refugees and host communities in Turkana and Garissa counties face significant bureaucratic hurdles and social/cultural discrimination based on ethnic identities. As reported, many refugees are often denied employment solely because they are refugees and hence lack key documentation that would enable them to get the Class M work permits. Furthermore, systems of patronage and corruption also form significant barriers for those who seek employment without the necessary political patronage or resources. As part of the ASALs, Kenyan Somalis of Garissa and the Turkana have long clashed with the central government, with tensions that extend into the colonial past. The Shifta War (1963–1967) between ethnic Somalis and the Government of Kenya and the endemic ongoing Turkana conflict continue to inform both host communities’ responses to decades of official and targeted marginalization of the ASAL regions. The findings and recommendations presented in the following sections are those stated in each report and should not be considered recommendations offered by the authors of this desk review.
The Kimetrica study was commissioned in response to reductions in funding for the Kenyan refugee operation, increased global competition for funds, and a common belief that not all refugees have the same humanitarian assistance needs. It focused on identifying vulnerabilities among refugees in Kakuma Camp and determining whether a permanent targeting mechanism is appropriate to prioritize assistance. The study did not support a permanent target mechanism, but it provided insight into household livelihoods, household size dynamics and other vulnerability myths, perspectives of refugees, and the current state of the UNHCR database. The findings and recommendations produced by the report are listed below. The final recommendation was particularly significant, as previous research (Oka, 2011, 2014, and Sanghi et al., 2016) also reported the large role of remittances in Kakuma’s social economy.

**Report Findings**

1. The only major external cash flows into the camp are via remittances and incentive work.
2. Not all households in the camp have the same level of vulnerability.
3. Only 4.2 percent of households were able to sustain themselves without any humanitarian assistance but were still dependent on social support networks for remittances or employment.
4. Any form of reduced assistance to certain groups is referred to as “targeting out” and is generally opposed by the majority of the camp population.
5. Several groups typically perceived as vulnerable are not necessarily as vulnerable as expected, or vice versa. Specifically, trading communities and elite clans within the Somali and Oromo groups are often conflated with their fellow citizens of origin in surveys. This problem accrues from the superficial nature of survey analysis, as individuals from these communities are not particularly forthcoming or are not asked about their social capital.
6. Households who farm or rear livestock face restrictions on livestock ownership and the scarcity of water that limit these activities in Kakuma.

**Report Recommendations**

1. Blanket coverage of assistance in Kakuma refugee camp should be supported, although incentives to encourage self-targeting out could be explored.
2. Groups traditionally perceived as “vulnerable” should be verified by the data before they receive preferential treatment.

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**Table 3. Studies of Past Programming Approaches in Turkana and Garissa Counties, Kenya**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Title</th>
<th>Study Implementer</th>
<th>Region of Focus</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Household Vulnerability Study: Kakuma Refugee Camp (2016)</td>
<td>Kimetrica</td>
<td>Turkana County, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakuma as a Marketplace (2017)</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation (IFC)</td>
<td>Turkana County, Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. A closer investigation of the sizes, sources, uses, and mechanisms for transfer of remittances in the context of refugee camps is needed (Kimetrica, 2016).

Self-Reliance in Kalobeyei?

The WFP/Oxford project is still ongoing and in its third phase of data collection. This is a mixed-methods approach with surveys focused on all refugee communities and qualitative interviews with all refugee and host communities where Kakuma serves as a control and Kalobeyei model as a natural experiment of the integrated refugee-host modality. They report that:

after just 15 months, […] self-reliance enabling factors—such the environment, assets, networks, markets, and public goods—remain similar across both sites, and, in some cases, are better in Kakuma. The major differences between the sites are in the aid model: Kalobeyei’s cash assistance [Bamba Chakula] and agricultural programmes. We find improved nutritional outcomes and a greater perception of autonomy in Kalobeyei, both of which may be attributable to differences in the aid models. (Betts et al., 2018b, 2019)

*Bamba Chakula* is the voucher program initiated in 2015 by WFP wherein the refugees of Kakuma get a mixed food and voucher package (400–500 KES/person) while the residents of Kalobeyei get only *Bamba Chakula* support (1,400 KES/person). *Bamba Chakula* is a restricted cash modality where recipients can only purchase certain goods from selected refugee and host (Kalobeyei) traders.¹

The WFP/Oxford team has also published a broader analysis of self-reliance among refugees in Kakuma and Nairobi (Betts et al. 2018a). Findings and recommendations from both studies are provided below.

Report Findings—Analysis of Kalobeyei Model

1. A combination of *Bamba Chakula*, kitchen gardens, and a household-based cultivation of farm plots help recipients make gains toward self-reliance in the Kalobeyei settlement.
2. Little access to cash or credit was identified as one of the significant problems preventing refugees from constructing their own livelihoods and seeking self-sufficiency.
3. Refugees are generally dissatisfied with their quality of life in the camp.
4. Food security and food diversity is low.
5. Relatively few refugees are part of community-based organizations.
6. The average monthly income is low.

¹Our own study (Oka et al., 2019) on the uses of the vouchers conducted in 2018 further investigated the reason for the findings reported by Betts et al., especially the “improved nutritional outcomes and a greater perception of autonomy.” Covered in more detail in Oka et al. (p. 40–41), it was not the aid model but the refugees’ ability to informally convert *Bamba Chakula* to larger amounts of cash through networks between the refugee traders and the refugees that might explain the difference. Cash obtained by resale of voucher-purchased food, where a sack of rice purchased through *Bamba Chakula* for 2,200 KES was resold to the same or other traders for 1,700 KES, gave Kalobeyei residents more cash to pay for essential non-food items (NFIs), for private education for their children, for medicines, and for emergencies. However, most of the refugees we spoke to and interacted with looked to Kakuma for the greater diversity of shops and goods, lower prices, comforts and entertainment, and for security and were able to access these through the conversion of *Bamba Chakula*. 
7. Travel between both refugee camps is common, but travel to other parts of Kenya and to the country of origin is infrequent.

8. Many in the host community “expect” parallel rather than integrated services.


10. Since diverse markets and social engagements take time to develop, refugees must participate in change; development is coproduced and cannot be designed from the outside.

Report Recommendations—Analysis of Kalobeyei Model

1. Promote kitchen gardens, which are positively correlated with better nutrition, higher dietary diversity, and reduced food insecurity.

2. Conduct assessments on the feasibility of larger-scale cultivation in agricultural areas. If large-scale agriculture is feasible, then it could lead to increased investment in infrastructure for water harvesting and management, thereby addressing the issues of chronic food and water scarcity in these areas.

3. Implement economic and risk assessment for the livestock market in Kalobeyei.

4. Invest in human capital since education, vocational training, and Swahili language skills correlate positively with employment.

5. Increase agency engagement with the Turkana host populations through meetings with host community representatives and public town halls (this point was especially noted as many host community respondents wanted additional meetings with aid organizations so that they do not receive conflicting messages and so that unrealistic expectations are addressed).

Report Findings—Broader Analysis of Refugees in Kakuma and Nairobi

1. Identity, including gender, is significant in determining the refugees’ economic opportunities in all locations.

2. Access to both financial capital as well as human capital such as education and health is an important source of variation in economic outcomes in all locations.

3. Employment rates and income levels vary by location.

4. Refugees in Kakuma earn far less than their counterparts in Nairobi. The cost of living in Kakuma is relatively higher, given the higher prices for goods, restrictions on employment (number and type of jobs), need to pay rent, electricity (payments to the generator grid firms), and labor (Turkana for domestic needs). In Nairobi, wages are largely market driven, and there are more jobs available within community enclaves (Eastleigh, Buruburu); refugees settled in Nairobi whether legally or not also have greater access to social and family support networks.

5. In Kakuma, despite lower income, the Turkana are more satisfied than other groups.

6. Refugee men are more likely to do sports activities than Kenyans or women.

7. The refugees, especially Somalis, tended to be more educated and able to leverage their skills to build businesses and other opportunities than their Turkana hosts.

8. While the Turkana felt safer than the refugees in the Kakuma area, they tended to be poorer than the refugees (especially the Somali and Oromo refugees).
Report Recommendations—Broader Analysis of Refugees in Kakuma and Nairobi

1. Focus on interventions to promote economic participation through advocacy.
2. Create programming and policy that focus on enhancing economic outcomes.
3. Strengthen opportunities and reduce constraints in each of these areas, which are key to enhancing well-being and improving refugee–host interactions.

Kakuma as a Marketplace

Two IFC studies, the first in 2017 and a larger follow-up study in 2019, looked at Kakuma as a marketplace and assessed the annual turnover at $54 million. The 2019 study examined 173 private-sector investments in refugee settings across the world and reported on five case studies, including two in Kakuma:

1. **Equity Bank**, which provides banking facilities, services, and financial workshops and entrepreneurial training to refugees.
2. **Sanivation**, which focuses on providing cleaner toilets and converting human waste into briquettes that can be used for cooking fuel.

In general, the Equity Bank and Sanivation efforts have been deemed as model pathways for private investment and partnership as a remedy to protracted refugee encampment through building skills and enhancing self-reliance. However, there was little indication in both of these interventions on the use of the refugees’ own entrepreneurial skills. Key findings and recommendations from both studies are presented in the following sections.

Report Findings

1. Refugees in the camp are less educated than the host community (although some refugee groups have more education than the host community).
2. Sixty percent of the women interviewed have no education, compared to 21 percent of men.
3. Consumer goods account for 61 percent of total refugee spending.
4. Consumption patterns and market penetration vary by sub-camp.
5. The only mobile network provider to the market is Safaricom, even though there is extensive mobile penetration (69 percent in Kakuma camp and 85 percent in Kakuma Town).
6. Most refugees took loans for daily needs, whereas those refugees in Kakuma town borrowed for education and business expansion.
7. In the town, 30 percent of the refugees identify as employed, while it is only 13 percent in the camp. Given that many refugees who live in the town move there because of employment, this makes sense. In the camp, 13 percent employment also makes sense because of the low number of jobs in relationship to the camp population (170,000) as opposed to town (40,000).
8. In the town, 39 percent of refugees identify as business owners, while the number is only 12 percent in the camps. (These numbers, of course, do not account for the difference in the populations of the two areas, with Kakuma Refugee Camp being 4 times the size of Kakuma town and having 10 times as many businesses.)
Successful impact and scale of private investment and engagement relied on three factors:

a. **Flexible financing**: venture capital-like approaches to funding, with smaller, more flexible investments

b. **Cross-sector partnerships**: collaboration across the government, humanitarian, NGO, private, and development finance sectors. Common understanding between stakeholders, building on existing assets and capabilities.

c. **Investment information on refugee needs, investment opportunities, and existing efforts**: especially those without the resources or connections to access or compile such information themselves

**Report Recommendations**

1. Enhanced private investment and partnership with NGOs and local stakeholders to develop new intervention models for increasing market interactions and income levels of both refugee and host residents of Kakuma. Examples included intervention-based models initiated by Renuvia (solar grids) and Sanivation (fecal briquettes for cooking fuel).

2. Pathways of private-sector engagement should include:
   
   a. Sharing capabilities through technical expertise
   
   b. Extending services to refugees
   
   c. Providing job training and entrepreneurship support to refugees
   
   d. Building businesses by targeting refugees as customers

**Major Research on Refugee Resilience and Self-Sufficiency in Kenya**

The World Bank desk review (Manji, 2019) is the most comprehensive review of the major research on self-sufficiency and resilience in Kenya, covering Kakuma/Kalobeyei, Dadaab, and Nairobi. This report, which reviewed 48 relevant studies and assessments pertaining to livelihoods of refugees and host communities in Kenya, sought to consolidate findings into one narrative regarding economic opportunities for these groups. The study cautions that refugees and host communities are not homogenous and stresses a need to support local markets and move away from an unsustainable assistance-based economy. The study affirms its limitations to inform broad policy and programmatic directions but stresses the consensus that the presence of refugees contributes to economic growth, that the refugee presence has paved the way for two-way economic integration between refugees and host communities, and that refugees in Kenya, while poor, are economically active and doing business with local communities, with primary sources of income being employment and running a business. Particularly relevant findings and recommendations are provided in the following sections.

**Report Findings**

1. Refugees in Kenya remain economically vulnerable, even as they have developed diverse livelihoods.

2. Humanitarian assistance remains the main source of employment and income for refugees, particularly in the camps.

3. For the most part, refugees and local host communities in Kenya remain poor and economically vulnerable and face a myriad of challenges, social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental.
4. Women are especially vulnerable and less likely to be employed.

**Report Recommendations**

While cautioning that relationships between refugees and hosts remain unstable, the study recommends:

1. Further advocacy for refugee rights and reforming the regulatory framework.
2. Support for refugee-led enterprises.
3. Enhancing the local inclusion of refugees in Kenya.
4. Focusing on development for hosting areas.
5. Focusing on specific refugee and host communities and tailoring interventions to specific contexts.
6. Carving out a role for the private sector and attracting more players.
8. Exploring self-reliance opportunities beyond designated hosting areas.
9. Investigating unexplored avenues include surveys on repatriation, research on agriculture as an economic activity, etc.

**Key Overarching Findings from Studies of Past Interventions**

1. Refugees need greater legal protection, ease of restrictions on their mobility, and access to capital, credit, markets, and employment.
2. Refugees and host communities tend to be impoverished and vulnerable overall.
3. Refugees make a positive contribution to local and regional economies and to the general economic well-being of host communities.
4. Careful attention needs to be paid to the determination of vulnerability, especially for women, children, and the disabled.
5. Private-sector engagement is welcomed but needs a closer engagement with local realities.
6. Development programs need to target both host communities and refugees in meaningful and sustainable ways.
7. More resources need to be applied to enhancing market penetration and market infrastructure.
8. Better coordination and communication between donors and implementing partners and enhanced engagement with local stakeholders (governments, refugees, hosts).

While these findings are indeed compatible and the recommendations commendable, very few non-academic studies have explored the complexities of intersections between the local cultural context, the socio-political realities, and the complexity of transferring and scaling of projects in which even the most well-planned intervention has a high chance of failure. By this, we mean that most of these reports have been commissioned by relief agencies and NGOs but are usually executed by outside enumerators within very small time frames, with significantly more focus on quantitative survey data over qualitative interview data and with specific monitoring/evaluation and/or programming goals. This has led to descriptions and assessments that tend to understate the impact of the complex intersections of the
psychological, social, cultural, economic, political, and ecological insecurities, stressors, and shocks in these settlements. In turn, these assessments are converted into policy programming wherein interventions are planned without addressing the impacts of these intersections.

3. **Academic Research**

There have been numerous academic studies by scholars and practitioners alike who have explored the issues of self-sufficiency and resilience, especially in the context of protracted refugee camps and host communities amidst harsh and marginalized landscapes. Within this topic area, scholars have homed in on the following questions in order to understand the barriers, opportunities, and potential pitfalls associated with pursuing resilience and self-sufficiency among encamped refugees:

1. How do host state policies, and the international community’s attempts to work within those policies, impact refugee’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency?
2. How can informal refugee economies that supplement humanitarian aid be leveraged to catalyze economic autonomy and resilience within refugee populations and their host communities?
3. How do host communities and refugees benefit from each other, and what are the positive and negative impacts of promoting refugee integrations into host communities?
4. What are the mental health impacts of long-term refugee encampment?
5. What are the unintended consequences of resilience-building in protracted camp settings?

The following sections present key findings from the literature surrounding these themes.

**Refugee Warehousing**

Like other humanitarian aid delivery mechanisms, one of the hallmarks of the UNHCR’s refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps is that they are conceived as total “humanitarian spaces”—ostensibly apolitical environments in which “humanitarians can work without hindrance and follow the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity” (Spearin, 2001, p. 22). In the context of refugee and IDP camps, the goal of humanitarian aid is to keep people alive and reasonably safe until they can be either repatriated to their homes or resettled in a different country (Guttieri, 2005). Slaughter & Crisp (2008) suggest that the UNHCR’s role has come to resemble a kind of surrogate state, “complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, healthcare, water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community participation, gender equality)” (2008, p. 132). The UNHCR effectively wields sovereign power within the refugee camp territory (Agier, 2011; Pandolfi, 2003). This “humanitarian mode of power” (de Waal 2002:264) entails its own cultural logic, largely based on assumptions that relief aid is an unmitigated good and an expression of Western ideals of universal human rights (Agier, 2011; de Waal, 2002).

However, a corollary to the concept of a neutral humanitarian space is the ideal that those receiving aid are passive recipients. In this model, refugees and other “recipients” or “beneficiaries” of humanitarian aid are expected to gratefully consume whatever is given to them and to refrain from seeking alternatives or additions to their rations within the humanitarian space (Agier, 2011; Oka, 2014).

Drawing on the classic anthropological theme of gift exchange (Mauss, 2002 [1925]; Paragi, 2017) argues
that NGOs (including the UNHCR) engage in a reciprocal relationship with international donors, in which they provide material documentation of pain and suffering as a kind of “return-gift” for financial support. This system of reciprocity, which Paragi calls “aid for pain, pain for aid” (2017, p. 324), perpetuates the humanitarian ideal of dependency, reinforces narratives that paint refugees and other aid recipients solely as pitiable victims lacking agency, and disincentivizes development of data-centered policies and practices that might empower communities to meaningfully improve their own conditions.

As protracted conflicts and long-term political instability have caused forced migrants to remain displaced for multiple years, scholars and policymakers have noted that extended conflicts also entail “protracted refugee situations” (Jamal, 2000; Loescher & Milner, 2005; Loescher et al., 2008; UNHCR, 2004). The UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which refugee populations of more than 25,000 people from a given country have been displaced for five or more years in developing countries (UNHCR, 2004). Moreover, in a protracted refugee situation:

refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance. (UNHCR, 2004)

Loescher et al. (2008) note that protracted refugee situations represent a fundamental shift in the global situation of refugees beginning in the 1990s. Before that time, they say, refugee situations were more like immediate emergencies, and the response to them included relatively quick repatriation after conflicts ended. However, as of 2008, more than two-thirds of refugees were trapped in protracted refugee situations with no end in sight.

Some scholars in the last decade have referred to situations of protracted refugee encampment as “warehousing of refugees,” a term coined by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in its World Refugee Survey in 2004 (Loescher & Milner, 2008; Smith, 2004). The term is used to highlight the indignity and inhumanity of the conditions refugees face under encampment during protracted refugee situations. It brings to attention that refugee and IDP camps are typically placed in harsh, inhospitable environments (Agier, 2008, 2011); that these camps are often insecure and located within, or in close proximity to, unstable border regions (Lischer, 2005); and that, in many cases, the enforced dependency of humanitarian spaces comes along with curtailed human rights, such as freedom of movement, access to education and health care, and employment (Ferris, 2008; Holzer, 2013).

In light of the fact that the average time refugees spend in refugee camps is over 17 years (Milner, 2009), these conditions imply that the warehousing model of refugee management constitutes a disaster in its own right—an analytical lens that could prove useful for understanding both the immediate and long-term effects of protracted refugee situations. However, this observation represents a gap in the literature—while scholars recognize the injustices of refugee warehousing, to our knowledge they have not been framed in terms of a disaster situation: specifically, that warehousing and protracted encampment are in themselves “disaster situations” with significant impacts on refugees’ capabilities and abilities to enhance their own resilience and to build self-sufficient and dignified lives.

While critique of the warehousing model/protracted encampment is not the primary focus of this desk review, it is important to note the established history of criticism within scholarship on refugee aid and management apparatuses. Not only do insights from academic sources suggest that the warehousing model of protracted refugee encampment is economically unsustainable, but taken together, they also
reveal a net negative impact on beneficiaries themselves, in terms of their physical and psychosocial health as well as their abilities to cope with and take advantage of any external interventions driving them to greater resilience and self-sufficiency. While all stakeholders acknowledge that the warehousing modality appears to demand dependency at the expense of self-reliance and dignity, the academic research suggests that barriers to self-sufficiency or the inability of the refugee to “break free from enforced reliance on external assistance” might, in fact, be deeply embedded within the complex psycho-biological-cultural and political economies of traumatic displacement and protracted encampment and hence require interventions that would move beyond training and opportunities toward counseling and mentoring support.

**Refugee Economies**

Many refugee camps worldwide foster diverse economic life—largely a product of the adversity and lack of assets/resources that long-term encampment entails (Jacobsen, 2005; Werker, 2007). Ironically, the structural constraints on economic agency that “humanitarian spaces” entail are actually implicated in the presence of thriving, robust informal economies that operate within refugee camps (Betts et al., 2014; Oka, 2011, 2014). Centeno & Portes (2006) claim that an informal economy will inevitably develop when people’s needs or desires cannot be met within formal economic structures. Nowhere is this condition more characteristic of everyday life than in large, isolated, insecure, and resource-poor refugee camps. Until the recent shifts in understanding refugee economies, most humanitarian agencies considered commercial economies initiated by refugees and hosts as informal, marginal, and attritional. This stemmed from various factors, including a) these economies tend to be unregulated by formal mechanisms, and b) because the refugees’ basic needs are supposed to be, in theory, already met by the assistance received (Oka, 2011).

**IN THE CONTEXT OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS, AID AGENCIES DEPEND ON THE INFORMAL ECONOMY TO HELP THEM ACHIEVE THEIR MOST BASIC GOAL OF KEEPING REFUGEES ALIVE.**

Yet Oka’s (2011, 2014) ethnographic research at Kakuma Refugee Camp challenges the idea that informal economies in food, luxury goods, and myriad services are “marginal and attritional.” Rather, they are central to the processes of urbanization that take place in long-term refugee camps (Dalal, 2015; Oka, 2011). Oka (2011) shows that the informal sector meets crucial needs in food, material goods, and services that humanitarian aid organizations cannot fulfill—it is no exaggeration to say that, in the context of protracted refugee situations, aid agencies depend on the informal economy to help them achieve their most basic goal of keeping refugees alive. Moreover, he demonstrates that Kakuma’s informal food economy provides refugees with items that remind them of home and gives them an important degree of agency in their consumption behaviors (Oka, 2014). Refugees with means have access to additional food items to supplement their provided rations, which are ubiquitously considered not to meet their basic needs. Rationed foods can also be sold or traded in the marketplace in order to purchase preferred items when the food provided does not align with cultural or personal preferences. When refugees can exercise unrestricted choice in what they want to purchase and consume, when they can indulge, however sporadically or regularly in culturally desired foods and other goods, they become agents within the broader paradigm that demands their dependency and
compliance. The informal economy also constitutes a source of dignity and a means of coping with the stressors associated with encampment by helping people reconstruct a sense of normalcy through consumption of “luxury” goods and services (those that are not provided through rations or other NGO programs) that remind them of home.

**Informal Economies as Catalyst to Normalcy and Dignity**

Other evidence exists linking economic choice and agency with dignity in highly stressful situations. In the somewhat different context of a besieged Sarajevo in the 1990s, Maček (2009) shows that people turned to the black market to access food and other goods that gave them a sense of normalcy in the midst of devastation. Indeed, multiple studies have shown that, no matter the degree of regimentation camp administrators or host governments attempt to place on economic activities, encamped refugees and IDPs consistently find ingenious ways of maintaining informal economies (Agier, 2011; Betts et al., 2014; Brees, 2008; Jacobsen, 2005; Oka, 2011, 2014; Werker, 2007). Betts and colleagues (2015) recognize that the informal sector is a site of vast creativity among refugees, and they suggest tapping into that potential by promoting economic innovation in refugee camps as a means of deriving participatory and empowering humanitarian structures that facilitate bottom-up solutions rather than impose them from the top down. They offer a number of recommendations for fostering an environment for innovation, including improved transportation and internet connectivity infrastructure, more permissive policies concerning the right to work and freedom of movement, and access to banking and credit.

Recently, however, UNHCR and other agencies have sponsored voucher programs in several refugee camps (Berg, Mattinen, & Pattugalan, 2013; Dalal, 2015; Karim, 2014). The World Food Programme offers several benefits of vouchers in these contexts outside of the element of control. Vouchers 1) are immediately available, 2) restore dignity and purchasing power, 3) expand dietary diversity, 4) improve transparency, 5) boost local economies, 6) lower costs, and 7) increase efficiency (Karim, 2014). Although less efficient than direct cash assistance, these voucher programs often tend to be the best modality given the context of market penetration, government restrictions, etc., and also offer the agencies greater perceived control over refugee consumption of sanctioned and non-sanctioned foods and NFIs. However, as outlined in detail in Oka et al. 2019 (see also footnote p. 17), voucher restrictions often tend to be onerous barriers for effective voucher use for those beneficiaries with local social capital and connections and tend to be easily surmountable for those with higher social capital and connections.

**Refugee–Host Relations**

**Negative Impacts of Integration**

Refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps are often assumed to negatively affect local host communities, and a number of researchers have identified myriad problems caused by the presence of refugees (Daniel & Knudsen, 1995). The most obvious of these is violent conflict between refugees and hosts, which can happen for a number of reasons. Crisp (2000) notes periodic outbursts of violence at Kakuma Refugee Camp, both between groups of refugees and between particular refugee groups (especially South Sudanese) and the Turkana host community. Jacobsen (1997) and Martin (2005) cite environmental degradation and natural resource competition as prominent causes of conflict in the vicinities of refugee camps. With very large numbers of people occupying a small area—all of whom
need water, fuel (like firewood and charcoal), and natural building materials—natural resources become depleted rather quickly. Of course, adverse environmental impacts like deforestation constitute major problems for sustainability and survival in their own right, even in the absence of refugee–host conflict.

Other scholars focus on problems related to economic disruption, poverty, and unequal treatment by international organizations. When IDPs from North Maluku province in Indonesia fled to North Sulawesi, initially positive relationships between IDPs and hosts turned sour when the sudden spike in population caused wages to decrease and housing costs to increase rapidly (Duncan, 2005). Chambers (1986) and Whitaker (2002) both present cases in which host community members faced unequal burdens associated with refugee presence, depending on their previous socioeconomic status: those who were already doing reasonably well benefited from employment opportunities and some humanitarian aid services, while those who were poorest to begin with (as well as women, more generally) typically became further impoverished as competition for food, jobs, and other resources increased. Additionally, host communities often grow to resent refugees in their area when they see “refugee-centrism” (Chambers 1986, p. 246)—vast amounts of resources and services from the international humanitarian aid agencies going only to refugees, when often the host communities near refugee camps are themselves impoverished and marginalized (Aukot, 2003; Duncan, 2005; Gengo et al., 2018; Vemuru et al. 2016).

Positive Impacts of Integration

Not all refugee-host relationships are negative. Given the long-term presence of refugee camps in protracted refugee situations, Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2004) suggest that efforts should be made to integrate refugees and local hosts in multiple ways. They show positive results in terms of economic and educational integration in Uganda through two main pathways: 1) economic integration, in which refugees are allowed unfettered entry into commercial activities, and 2) social integration, in which refugee and host community children are educated together from the primary level onward. In their Ugandan context, they show that allowing refugees to self-settle, rather than remain in formal settlements or encampments, is crucial to promoting refugee self-reliance. Being integrated into host community social and political life contributed to refugees business owners’ commercial security and sustainability; furthermore, integrated schools drew funding from the UNHCR and implementing partners, benefitting host community students as well (Dryden-Peterson & Hovel, 2004). Other scholars have also explored economic relationships between refugees and host communities. In spite of frequent tensions, refugee camps are often major sources of employment for host community members, who engage in trade and other business inside the camps, perform domestic labor, or work in refugee-owned businesses (Vemuru et al., 2016; Whitaker, 2002). Additionally, food and other goods flow into refugee camps from humanitarian aid organizations as well as through international trade networks; both pathways lead to the informal economy and black markets, to which host community members have relatively easy access (Callamard, 1994; Oka, 2011; Vemuru et al., 2016). These economic opportunities offer more than just a social benefit to host communities. Despite inhabiting a highly “refugee-centric” landscape, there is evidence that Turkana living near Kakuma Refugee Camp have higher nutritional status than their rural counterparts and that the effects of social and economic interaction with some integration at Kakuma are essentially equivalent to the nutritional benefits of sustained economic development (Gengo et al., 2018). This economic integration is multifaceted and includes both access to external goods and resources gained through refugees’ trade networks, as well as opportunities for both trade and employment associated with refugees themselves.
Specifically, Turkana living in Kakuma (town and surrounding areas) and Lorugum (an area with sustained development programming) have significantly higher sum of skinfolds (body fat composition) and nutritional security, than those living in Lokichoggio (declined after the peacekeeping mission departed between 2005 and 2010) or Lorengo (an entirely pastoralist area 25 km from Kakuma). However, among Turkana living in Kakuma Town, the authors observed a wider range variation in body fat composition, with some doing very well and others very poorly. This is likely associated with inequality in access to market resources among hosts living in Kakuma. Among the Turkana living in Lorengo and Lokichoggio, the variation in body fat composition was narrower, with the bulk of the population in these settlements showing lower nutritional status. Skinfold measurement has been used for decades as an indicator of nutritional status among human biologists studying northern Kenyan pastoralists, including Turkana (Campbell et al., 2003, 2011; Pike, 1999, 2004; Pike et al., 2010, 2016), because of the sensitivity of subcutaneous fat stores to rapidly changing environmental conditions that characterize ASAL areas.

Finally, Ohta (2005) shows ethnographic evidence of gift exchange, friendships, and intermarriage between refugees at Kakuma and their Turkana hosts, which he sees as the potential for peacebuilding between these often conflicting communities.

Often simultaneously, there are many ways in which host communities and refugees benefit from each other. Refugee–host trade networks are mutually beneficial (Callamard, 1994; Oka, 2011): refugees receive locally available resources to supplement the rations they receive from the UNHCR and other NGOs, and hosts (who often live in the isolated areas where refugee camps tend to be placed) gain indirect access to international commodity markets through the flow of goods into refugee camps. Additionally, hosts sometimes benefit from the investment in economic development and infrastructural improvements that accompany refugee camps targeted toward refugees, such as roads and integrated schools (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004).

At Kakuma Refugee Camp, refugees and the Turkana host community coexist alongside one another in a complex, contentious web of relationships. Extensive trade and humanitarian aid networks have proliferated in the area as the refugee population continues to grow, and members of the host community have access to food and other commodities via the multifaceted economic system in the camp that includes both licit and illicit exchange (Oka, 2011, 2014). Likewise, refugees gain access to resources like meat, building materials, charcoal, and firewood through their trade relationships with Turkana. While evidence from previous studies suggests mutual economic benefit between refugees and hosts at Kakuma (Gengo et al., 2018; Sanghi et al., 2016; Vemuru et al., 2016, 2018), a high degree of hostility exists between these communities that often overrides these more subtle findings. An essential experience of refugee-host relations at Kakuma is a state of fear and distrust—a condition produced by the structures of humanitarian governance that limit refugees’ mobility and keep them in an extended state of limbo within the territory of the Turkana host community.

Most striking are the narratives of the violence that proliferate within each group. Stories circulate among Turkana who live in close proximity to the camp or who occupy communities that have strong trading ties with the camp; these stories depict refugees as hostile toward Turkana. These stories typically involve Turkana (particularly women) being robbed, cheated, sexually harassed, beaten, raped, or even killed when they go to the camp to trade. While these situations have indeed taken place, they usually link to individual disputes that can but usually do not rise to the level of group conflict. The overall narrative of fear among the Turkana suggests a frequency of violent occurrences that is not supported by evidence. A Bayesian analysis using both survey and ethnographic data from the 2016
World Bank study suggested that the probability of actual violence in any interaction is only 6 percent, given the low actual frequency of violence (5 percent), and despite the overriding perceptions of violence shared by more than 50 percent (Oka et al., 2016; Vemuru et al., 2016). Opposed to these stories are verified refugee accounts of violent raiding, robbery, and intimidation by local gangs, which are composed of Turkana and refugees. Refugees find it inconceivable that hosts could be harmed in the camp without retribution, citing their status as occupiers of Turkana land, their belief in the violent potential of Turkana if provoked, and their defensive vulnerability in contrast to Turkana weaponry. Within each community, circulating stories combine to construct and reinforce an overarching narrative that places the communities in distrustful opposition to one another (Gengo, 2019). If we try to understand these narratives from a purely objective stance, they appear diametrically at odds with one another; we would have to assess the veracity of claims on both sides and make a judgment for one community or the other. However, an objective perspective is not only inappropriate for this context, but it moreover leads to a fundamentally unproductive analysis. Large-scale narratives, consistently reinforced within communities, are not mere reflections of perceived reality; they are actively involved in constructing social life (Austin, 1962; Quine, 1968; Searle, 1995). Because narratives have the capacity to inform and shape people’s lived experience and orientation to the world, they can become reality for those who receive, reproduce, and embody them in their behavioral practices.

Gengo’s 2019 research reveals that these oppositional narratives present a significant barrier to refugee-host integration at Kakuma. Radically divergent narratives of the violence cannot be discounted as mere stories that can be easily overcome simply by providing more opportunities for mutual economic benefit. These narratives both arise from and reinforce deep-seated distrust that has developed over the years and has now become part of the cautionary sub-narratives that describe the “typical interactions” between the Turkana and different groups of refugees—"Ethiopians/Darfuris are good," “South Sudanese fight with us,” “Somalis are rich and pay well but also exploit,” “Congolese are good but sometimes argue over payment.” This is especially true for Turkana interactions with the South Sudanese Dinka and Nuer refugee communities, who have had the most frequent and most violent clashes with the Turkana, and the Somali refugee community, whose deep history of business and cultural orientation toward trade, commerce, and finance makes them the primary drivers of the market economy at Kakuma (Vemuru et al., 2016). Moreover, narratives constitute lived reality for these communities, and they play out in every interaction between refugees and hosts. Gengo (2019) suggests that any programmatic effort to meaningfully integrate refugees and hosts must foreground a large-scale peacebuilding component that directly engages these narratives, focusing on the key fracture points within them. Examples of proactive relationship-building and existing mutual benefit—such as economic relationships of trade and employment, as well as friendship and inclusion of individual hosts in various social activities—serve to productively destabilize the otherwise negative narratives that exist in both communities. These positive exceptions should be emphasized, and cultural education might help communities to better understand each other’s histories, assumptions, and behaviors. However, this effort cannot be limited to chiefs, elders, or other politically powerful actors; entire communities are stakeholders in potential development programs, and peacebuilding efforts will not be successful unless they target as many members of these communities as possible.

Any programmatic effort to meaningfully integrate refugees and hosts must foreground a large-scale peacebuilding component that directly engages these narratives [of the violent other].
Psychological and Physical Well-Being

A significant amount of research has been conducted on the psychological impacts of long-term refugee encampment/warehousing (Kaplan, 2009; Miller & Rasmussen, 2010; Paardekooper, de Jong & Hermans, 1999). The majority of such studies draw connections between the homogenized refugee experiences of war, violence, trauma, and displacement on one hand and psychological/psychiatric diagnoses such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the other. Hollifield and colleagues (2013) have developed a psychological screening instrument—the Refugee Health Screener-15—specifically for use in refugees; they claim it is useful for all refugees, no matter their background or geographic origin. In the realm of public health, there is a vast body of research conducted in refugee camps that focuses on communicable diseases, as well as on infrastructural limitations, sanitation, and hygiene (Cronin et al., 2008, 2009; Dick, 1984; Kalipeni & Oppong, 1998; Rowland & Nosten, 2001; Shultz et al., 2009; Toole & Waldman, 1993, 1997). Compounding the psychological effects of war and the stress of encampment, as well as the generally poor sanitation and rampant disease, warehoused refugees typically have very limited access to medical care or psychological health services (Agier, 2008; Lischer, 2005). Still, the immediate health implications of refugee encampment are well understood, as they have clear connections to larger concepts in public health.

However, there is an enormous gap in our knowledge about the effects of protracted refugee situations and refugee warehousing on long-term health, physiology, and psychosocial stress—specifically, how this stress might affect the refugees' capabilities and abilities to respond to incentives, opportunities, and interventions. Within biological anthropology, few scholars have examined the long-term impacts of having been a refugee. In a retrospective study, Clarkin (2008) measured the adult height and adiposity (body fat stores) of Hmong refugees who were either born in a war zone in Laos or Thailand or were displaced as infants, presuming either of these would have been associated with malnutrition at critical developmental stages. He found that being born in a war zone was associated with higher adiposity and centralized fat deposits, while being displaced in infancy predicted shorter adult height. Unfortunately, this study offers very little insight into how protracted refugee encampment might impact long-term health since the independent variables measured are short-term experiences of malnutrition. Rather, the study is more relevant for deciphering the effects of war on human health and development, which are at least somewhat understood (Clarkin, 2010; Levy & Sidel, 2000; Singer & Hodge, 2010).

Health Predictors

Recently, Gengo, Oka, and Gettler (2017) showed that greater access to markets, driven by better social networks, as well as ethno-historical specialization in trading, predicts higher nutritional status at Kakuma Refugee Camp. In other words, Somalis and Oromo Ethiopians are better able to access resources through their existing trade networks and cultural knowledge of trading practice than are members of other refugee communities such as South Sudanese or Congolese, resulting in better nutritional status. Likewise, access to the refugee market economy in Kakuma also has a positive impact on nutritional status among the Turkana host community, compared with Turkana living further away.
from Kakuma (Gengo et al., 2018). Gengo (2019) also found that consumption of “luxury” foods—particularly sweets—may have a positive effect on immunity due to improved psychological well-being that goes along with the normalcy and comfort associated with consuming these foods. Simultaneously, however, these consumption practices may lead to unhealthy body composition, inflammation, and, in the long term, heightened risk of cardiovascular disease. Among “survivors”—single, jobless men with few resources and high vulnerability—Gengo also identified larger material and emotional support networks than other demographic groups, and these men also have the most sources of material support outside of Kakuma (remittances). Despite their unique vulnerabilities, their observed stress physiology profile is no worse than other groups. These findings likely point to a buffering effect of social support that may be considered a form of adaptive resilience since they actively cultivate social support networks in response to their precarious social position. Particularly for these “survivors,” prosocial networking behaviors serve to mitigate the physiological stress that might be expected under the adverse conditions of refugee encampment.

Pastoralist Economies

African and Eurasian pastoralist economies and their intersections with markets have long been a focus of research by anthropologists, resulting in a wealth of information on the contentious relationships that many pastoralist communities have with markets (see introduction in McPeak et al., 2011). Pastoralist relationships with their livestock often transcend the commodity value of livestock found in many agricultural societies. Pastoralists also often find themselves in conflicts over grazing land, water, and borders/boundaries with farmers and other settled communities in contemporary nation-states. Most pastoralist societies have co-evolved with their physical and ecological landscapes that extends over decades and even centuries, learning how to socially and culturally mitigate changing environmental and (in the recent decades) political and economic conditions, primarily through diversification and adaptation.

In a study of pastoralists in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia, McPeak and Little (2005) found that pastoralists have responded to recent herd depletion—a consequence largely of more frequent and intense droughts—by diversifying within-family economic strategies. While some family members tend herds, others enter the wage labor market, pursue small-scale agriculture, or invest in formal education. Non-pastoral activities tend to be deployed as a means of bolstering pastoral activities. Wages are used to purchase livestock or additional food so livestock do not have to be sold, agricultural pursuits supplement food resources, and education is seen as an investment in future earning potential. Similarly, Opiyo et al. (2015) show that Turkana resilience to drought shock is primarily based in diversification. They reiterate earlier findings of within-family livelihood diversity, but they also note Turkana have diversified their livestock species holdings to take advantage of different animals’ drought and disease tolerance, as well as variation in animals’ fecundity. Whereas Turkana historically relied heavily on cattle, they are now herding goats, sheep, and camels as well. However, Fratkin (2001) warns that diversification can actually result in increased social stratification, rural-to-urban migration as educated children sometimes decide to pursue opportunities elsewhere with their education, and continued food insecurity among women and children who remain sedentary. Moreover, he suggests that development programs aimed at privatizing communal lands or promoting shifts away from pastoralism can exacerbate these problems. He argues that pastoralism remains a viable livelihood for ASAL-living people in East Africa, and pastoralists’ own measures to increase their resilience while maintaining culturally significant pastoral activities should be supported, not tampered with.
In northeast Kenya, there may be lower livestock diversification compared to the northwest region, with pastoralists relying heavily on camels. Although it is not entirely clear why pastoralists in the northeastern region have not diversified their holdings to the same extent, there are likely two primary reasons. First, camels may already be more resistant to drought shocks characteristic of ASAL environments than most other livestock, and there is less need to diversify. Second, camels may have more cultural value than other animals in this heavily Somali Kenyan area. Elhadi, Nyariki & Wasonga (2015) demonstrate about the cultural and economic importance of camel milk for northeast Kenya pastoralists and encourage support for pastoralism in this area in the form of promoting camel milk consumption and marketing as a way to improve resilience to climate change. In a study of livestock traders in the Moyale and Garissa areas, Mahmoud (2008) shows that traders mitigate risks associated with this industry by forming seller-seller partnerships both within and between locations. At a local level, apprenticeship/mentorship relationships are formed between established traders and new entrants, while between-location partnerships are employed to monitor and secure market conditions across nodes in trader networks. Formal partnerships such as the Moyale Livestock Traders’ Association also hedge against risk by assisting members facing asset loss. These types of relationships, based on trust, contribute to both adaptive (informal partnerships and information transfer) and transformative (formal associations) resilience to shocks associated with shifting market conditions, climate change, and risks associated with transport and livestock theft.

In refugee hosting areas such as Turkana and Garissa, where the respective host communities (Turkana and Ogaden Somali) tend to be predominantly subsistence pastoralists, the presence of commercial and livestock markets acts as both boon and curse for pastoralist economies. Host communities can and do access these markets; they also gain access to relief or development public services such education and health. Moreover, they indulge and engage in various social and economic exchange relationships with the refugees and relief agencies workers. Often, the demand for meat within the refugee populations places high pressure on local brokers (nimuchuruz) to aggressively procure animals for the livestock markets in ways that are not appreciated nor desired by the producers themselves. This is especially true for the Turkana, who do not regard their livestock as commodities and see market sale as a final option in face of hardship or sudden need. However, in Garissa County, the local Somali host community comprises primarily Ogaden Somali, and these pastoralists are more comfortable with the market as a forum for exchange than are the Turkana. Hence they share the land and water around Dadaab Refugee Camp (Dagahaaley, Ifo, and Hagadera sub-camps) with Somali refugees who were pastoralists in Somalia prior to their displacement and who continue to maintain livestock (estimated livestock population of goats maintained by refugees in Dadaab ranges from 40,000 to 60,000).

**Understanding Self-Sufficiency and Resilience in the Protracted Refugee Landscape**

While refugee integration and self-sufficiency through the humanitarian-development approach have been part of various refugee response policies, most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa during the post-independence periods (1950–1970s) (see Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018), the sudden spurt of refugees in the 1980s and 1990s led to the dominance of the protracted refugee encampment model. In the late 1990s, there was a tacit acknowledgment by UNHCR that protracted refugee encampment was both unsustainable and undesirable for all stakeholders, including donors, implementers, hosts, and recipients. By the early 2000s, the term self-reliance became part of official UNHCR policy vis à vis refugee management (Crisp, 2003). Defined broadly as “the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community to meet essential needs in a sustainable and dignified manner,” this goal is based on the assumption or understanding that “refugees have the skills, capacity and agency to stand on
their own and sustain themselves without depending on external humanitarian aid” and “that self-reliance is an integral and underpinning part of any durable solution” (Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018, p. 1459; UNHCR, 2005). According to Omata (2017), the tipping point for action toward self-reliance in Buduburam Camp in Ghana started around 2011–2012 where the overt perspectives of thriving refugee-run businesses within the camp seemed to stand in stark contradiction to the idea of refugees as vulnerable populations in persistent need of relief. Specifically, Omata uncovered the clear dissonance between the contradictory narratives of successful refugee entrepreneurs and the dependent refugee that were held simultaneously by UNHCR and other relief and development workers and suggested that successful entrepreneurial refugee as a model for building self-reliance was not sustainable as it was based on an uncritical look at a (relatively) few individuals or groups. In Kakuma, the push toward self-reliance started in 2013–2014 with the Lodwar Roundtable but was itself based on academic research and relief agency reports on market penetration and refugee entrepreneurship conducted in the late 2000s (Oka, 2011, 2014; WFP, 2014). Other studies suggest that the Syrian refugee crises in 2011 and the growth of large camps in Jordan such as Zataari enabled an opportunity to test new modalities for relief, one of which was the use of local markets and vouchers or cash-based assistance in lieu of or in addition to in-kind food aid. This enabled relief agencies to evaluate if and how these new modalities would confer greater choice and dignity and thereby enhance local entrepreneurship and self-reliance. While initially the program in Zataari involved purchase from special shops run by WFP personnel, the evaluation showed that it was for more efficient to let local traders and shopkeepers import and sell food to the refugees receiving the cash-based aid. Self-sufficiency is hence seen as both a durable solution/remedy for aid dependency and the “dependency syndrome” that “cripples refugees’ initiative and responsibility for their own life and leading to a loss of dignity, self-respect and even depression” (Omata, 2017, p. 146).

Risks and Potential Pitfalls of Uncritical Self-Reliance Programming

In a recent article that identifies problems and risks associated with the drive to self-reliance, Easton-Calabria and Omata (2018) suggest that in the face of growing donor fatigue, pushback from host governments, and the unsustainability of protracted refugee encampment as an inevitable “end state,” UNHCR and other stakeholders are placing the responsibility for self-sufficiency back upon the shoulders of the refugees themselves, focusing on individual self-sufficiency through market engagement rather than communal self-sufficiency that combines both market and non-market modalities (pp. 1461-1463, pp.1466-1467). Furthermore, the overt ability of refugee encampments to sustain businesses and markets and seemingly survive and even thrive without reliance on foreign aid obfuscates the inherent hierarchies and inequalities within the refugee communities themselves. The winners of refugee self-sufficiency assessments are often those individuals or families who had pre-existing networks, skills, and access to capital and support. The vast majority of refugees, especially women, children, and single men remain dependent on relief, low-income/mobility employment/entrepreneurial activities, or on what Omata (2017, p. 146) refers to as “remittance clusters” (indirectly benefiting from remittances to a third party by way of labor exchange, social friendship networks, and charity).
Another (and related) critique is that the modalities used by donors and implementing agencies to try and build refugee self-sufficiency then falls upon the “the provision[ing] of income-generating projects, micro-finance programs and vocational training” that makes sense only when refugees are given an enabling environment to pursue economic autonomy in a host state (Omata, 2017, p. 5). Given that despite their formal signing of the New York Declaration and agreement to the CRRF guidelines and objectives, most refugee-hosting nations’ legal infrastructures continue to restrict refugee mobility and formal access to capital or labor markets. Even those host-nations that legally allow refugees to work or recently have changed their legal systems to comply with CRRF guidelines have various issues in enforcing these laws in the face of sociocultural and economic discrimination against refugees and local political realities. Furthermore, refugee camps tend to be located in adverse or uninviting residential geographies with limited resources and market penetration. Hence, even with increasing support for entrepreneurial activity and refugee inclusion in the private sector, “the possibility [of attaining] self-reliance [through such programs] remains very limited regardless of how much support these NGOs provide or how diligently refugees strive to achieve it” (Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018, p. 1465). There is a growing consensus among academic researchers that attempts to generate refugee self-sufficiency have to be undertaken by a collaboration of locally engaged stakeholders under the restrictions of limited and disabling rather than enabling environments. What this means is that interventions cannot be planned and executed with the assumption of an enabling environment, even under the most progressive legal and political hosting conditions. For example, most studies—including those reviewed in this document—have noted that the primary barriers to refugee self-sufficiency are lack of freedom of movement and legal access to employment opportunities, markets, capital, and credit. Freedom of movement and legal access to employment opportunities, markets, capital, and credit are hence seen as primary enabling conditions. In this regard, Uganda has long been known for its progressive refugee hosting approach (as noted in the section of CRRF in Africa) and has indeed created such an enabling environment. However, according to UNHCR, 95 percent of refugees in Uganda are still living in and around the 11 designated settlements, mostly clustered in the North and West Nile regions that are among the poorest and most underdeveloped areas in the country. Despite the grant of small agricultural plots to refugees in these settlements (initially ranging from 900m² to 2500 m²), the majority of refugees remain dependent on food relief assistance and other aid. According to UNHCR Uganda, most “refugees in Uganda have limited income-generating opportunities, and both refugees and host communities are challenged by the lack of access to capital/formal financial services; lack of access to cultivable land and water; poor market connectivity; limited skills and the few formal employment opportunities” (UNHCR Uganda, 2019). The WFP Uganda brief for June 2019 states that the arrival of more refugees has led to a decrease in the size of the individual plots and that the organization distributed 11,000 metric tons of in-kind food aid and $2.95 million in cash-based transfers. They have further stated, “WFP Uganda requires US$30 million to support lifesaving food assistance for 1.2 million refugees between July and December. Unless additional funding is received, WFP will not be able to provide the required assistance from August” (WFP-Uganda, 2019).
This suggests that even when the most heralded primary barriers to refugee self-sufficiency and enhanced resilience—lack of freedom of movement and lack of access to land, markets, and job opportunities—not present, the bulk of refugees still show remarkably low levels of capacity for self-sufficiency and remain dependent on relief. This should serve as a warning against interventions that solely focus on policy changes related to freedom of movement and access. Most of these studies focus on deep structural barriers that affect refugee-hosting areas within host nations and call for systemic overhaul of relief and development interventions. At the very least, these studies also draw attention to the need for intersectional assessments that address the complex nature of the disabling environments affecting refugees and their hosts in these areas and the barriers posed in enhancing resilience and self-sufficiency.

Social Underpinnings of Resilience and Self-Sufficiency

A primary reason underlying such barriers is that while refugee self-sufficiency is indeed a laudable goal, the term itself is often used uncritically and lacks definitive measurement methodology or achievement modality, usually in the specific context of protracted refugee encampment (see review in Omata, 2017). Specifically, various assessments of self-sufficiency have hinged on measuring the ability of refugees to meet their daily needs without relying on relief or humanitarian aid but often fail to account for other systems of dependence that are enabling survival and even thriving of refugees living in encampment conditions. These include reliance or even dependence on external means of support, especially remittances; joining the informal economy in unskilled wage labor; or starting small enterprises. As many researchers have pointed out, the dependency syndrome is usually seen as a negative unsustainability only in the context of state-help or humanitarian aid/relief, leading to idleness and lethargy, and the deterioration of self-sufficiency and resilience. On the other hand, refugees’ dependence on their own networks is usually seen as a positive “communal solidarity,” irrespective of the sustainability of such lives and whether these networks are necessarily able to meet essential needs in a sustainable manner and with dignity. In other words, self-reliance according to much relief criteria may be achieved if/when the beneficiaries are not dependent on aid or interventions from formal humanitarian sectors. However, this criteria may be fulfilled by beneficiaries who do not receive any formal economic aid or support but who remain dependent on social support networks and hence are not self-reliant based in a broader definition of “self-reliance.”

As pointed out by Omata (2017) and various others, there is a distinct gap in assessing refugee self-sufficiency, specifically in the form of a rigorous methodology that goes beyond the focus on economic pathways. Betts et al. (2017, p. 716) argue that refugees “occupy a distinctive institutional space” and that “refugee economies” represent a distinctive analytical space insofar as refugees face different formal and informal institutional barriers and distortions in their economic lives compared to nationals or other migrants.” While they are right in this, refugee and host communities and relief economies are inextricably tied to each other, forming a particular space defined by these interactions but with amorphous boundaries. Within these spaces, self-sufficiency in the absence of relief or other institutional forms of support is an emergent outcome of multiple factors. In their analysis of variation in economic outcomes

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among urban and encamped refugees in Uganda, Betts et al. (2017, p. 717) suggest various intervening and interdependent factors including “regulatory context, education, occupation, social networks, gender, and the number of years spent in exile.” Entrepreneurship is an important explanation for “outliers” within the refugee community, explaining why some refugees have significantly higher incomes.

Based on our own research, entrepreneurship is a learned skill that often derives from family traditions and teachings, from social networks that enable support and safety nets, and from access to credit and capital (Oka, 2018). This falls in line with Omata (2017), who sees the role of preexisting social inequalities and the difference in access to various forms of capital as a primary reason for the variation in both economic and other well-being outcomes. His findings based on his long-term research in Buduburam Camp in Ghana with Liberian refugees, accessed specifically through “life-history interviews [suggested] that the vast majority of the refugees in the poorer economic categories [usually with lower or no education, fewer social support links, unskilled, women, children, elderly] had challenging pre-displacement lives in the Liberian interior” while the refugees who were well off even without any means of income tended to come from urban areas and had families who had long settled in Western countries. He identifies the remittance economy as one of the primary drivers of socioeconomic inequality, even for refugee entrepreneurs. Remittances that came regularly enabled their recipients to maintain higher qualities of life, buffered them against shocks and stressors, and in the case of entrepreneurs, provided means of credit and capital unavailable to those who did not receive remittances.

Remittances as a key to refugee social economies has been observed by various studies, both NGO and academics (Kimetrica, 2016; Betts et al., 2018a; Oka, 2011, 2014). However, Omata (2017) goes a step further in his analysis by developing the idea of remittance clusters: networks of social relationships between 1) individuals in the refugee diaspora who send capital to their friends and relatives in camps, 2) the recipients who use this money to engage with local economies, 3) the traders and service providers who receive the money from the primary recipients, and 4) friends and relatives of the primary recipients in the camp who get smaller proportions of the remitted amounts as loans or gifts. This finding has also been observed in Kakuma, as money comes through the hawala banks or the formal networks of Western Union/Moneygram/M-Pesa and is distributed through the aforementioned channels. Hence a regular source of remitted “income” has economic and social significance and impact far beyond the two primary nodes in the larger remittance cluster/network.

Pastoralists within the ASALs have developed their exchange and resource redistribution modalities, specifically bond friendships and immediate reciprocity (Fratkin, 2001; Schneider, 1965). Bond friendship is a relationship established between pastoralists through an “ask,” wherein one individual asks another for resources with the common understanding that the need of the asker is sufficient for a one-way transfer. The “ask” even enters into buying–selling transactions between pastoralists, where the amount needed by the seller might be more than the market value of the commodity. However, it is incumbent on the buyer to assess the real need of the seller and give the amount demanded, even if it diverges from the market price. The friendships built in this are not dependent on obligated reciprocity but a mutual understanding of need and urgency. However, the primary way in which most pastoralist communities in the ASAL region, especially the Turkana, engage with markets is through immediate reciprocity/gratification.

Hence, many studies have shown that projects such as the WFP Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) program in Turkana have had limited success because they are based on delayed returns: for example,
work for a week and you are paid once or twice a month. Many Turkana prefer to earn a daily wage, giving them: 1) an immediate return; 2) the flexibility to spend money immediately rather than wait, and 3) work for immediate needs (see next section). They distrust markets because their interactions with markets take place under conditions out of their control (price, availability), unlike the bond friendship or the immediate reciprocity. Decades of ethnographic research on people living in such highly stressed and shocked environments suggests that the normative economic methods of assessing self-sufficiency (income, assets, skills, education, etc.) fail to capture the non-economic pathways that have a significant impact—specifically, social networks.

The Role of Social Networks

Turkana, Kenyan Somali, and other communities living in ASALs have developed sociocultural means of adaptation, primarily seen through social networks built around different systems of exchange that confer resilience to normative stressors and shocks (Juma, 2016). Initially seen as one of the many factors affecting both self-sufficiency and resilience, social networks are now emerging as one of the primary predictors of economic, health, and other outcomes of well-being (see Jennings, 2019). A recent longitudinal study on U.S. students (Lin et al., 2019) suggests that social networks—in particular, network attributes such as size, centrality, density, and triadic closure (A knows B, B knows C, C knows A)—predicted health disparities and outcomes far better than individual health measurements such as heart rate or blood pressure. Other research, including our own, also suggests that social networks are also predictors of economic, social, and political status, as they are the key determinants of an individual's ability to access social capital (Gengo et al., 2017).

Omata uses the definition of social capital by Pierre Bourdieu: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 51, in Omata, 2017, p. 8). Hence, social capital composed of “first, the sum and quality of resources [which can be assets, skills, education, health access]; and second, the social relationships that allow individuals to access these resources” (Omata 2017, p. 8). Hence according to Omata (2017, p. 8), the volume and quality of assets are dependent on the very potency of the social networks that one can effectively mobilize. Hence an individual’s role and place within the larger social network as well as the size and strengths of their links with other members of the network can enable the individual to access the skills and abilities needed for self-sufficiency and also determine the individual’s resilience to shocks and stressors.

USAID defines resilience as “the ability of people, households, communities, countries and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth” (USAID, 2018). More simply, resilience is the ability to manage adversity and change without compromising current and future well-being. Most emphasis on resilience in the relief and development world has been aimed at policy and programmatic shift from focusing on generating resilience to shocks provided by large-scale crises, to understanding how both chronic stressors and systemic shocks can lead to repeated poverty recidivism and endemic precarity for
vulnerable groups. However, at the very basis, resilience can be the ability to construct a normal life or try in the face of structural opposition.

A recent successful academic-practitioner intervention between psychologists, ethnographers, and practitioners in Palestine incorporates the concept of sumud, or steadfastness, into the programming. The lead researcher, Laura Miller-Graff, notes that one of their local partner’s goals is not simply to help people feel better but to push back against their adverse conditions. Sumud, she says, means resilience through activities in daily life. It’s resilience in the context of an occupation that seeks to undermine aspects of daily life. And so the preparation of meals, the participation in activities related to one’s culture and heritage can take on a lot of significance in terms of, “I’m challenging a structure that is actively trying to degrade those things.” (quoted in Rattini, 2019)

Resilience is a multi-scalar measure and marker of individuals’ and groups’ abilities to mitigate chronic and drastic stressors and shock, either by maintaining or returning to pre-stressor/shock states of well-being and stability (absorptive capacity) or successfully managing to generate different long-term states of well-being and stability (adaptive capacity), and the impact of broader structural (social, cultural, economic, political) mechanisms and institutions that can aid or hamper larger societal abilities to anticipate, manage, and even thrive under systemic shocks while reducing the chronic stressors (transformative capacity).

Social networks are causal for social and hence other forms of capital and also to the three resilience capacities and can be quantified in the form of three levels of network edges:

a) **Bonding Ties**: intra-community, close kin or friends/neighbors, mostly tight relationships between individuals who are in similar situations. These enable expedient, short-term, limited support but ensure survival (absorptive capacity). One key factor in bonding ties is the role played by triadic closure within the bonding networks. The more supporting people you know who know each other, the better the resilience.

b) **Bridging Ties**: ties between individuals that span across different communities, clans, and other social and geographical divides. When a person has ties that they call on for support in other communities or in their larger diasporan network (e.g., remittances), they can distribute their risk and marshal resources over a larger network. This leads to enhanced social capital and greater resilience (absorptive and adaptive capacity).

c) **Linking Ties**: ties between a person and individuals who are of higher status, who can provide short- and long-term opportunities, support, and protection. These ties provide the strongest protection against various forms of stressors and shocks and are linked to high social capital and resilience (absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities).

Apart from just the number of the level of these connections between the individual and other members of his/her network, the ways in which these connections are structured also matter in determining resilience. Understanding and building policy and programming that is centered on social networks is also a response to the critique of “resiliency humanitarianism.” This refers to a “particular rationale of care, camp coordination, and management which emerges within neoliberal government and which focuses on assisting refugees and IDPs to adapt to, and survive, crisis with the aim of responsibilizing them” (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p. 333). This can either be seen a common good for all stakeholders in creating responsible “citizens” or, in the (more) likely event of failure in reaching adequate levels of enhanced resilience and self-sufficiency, can be seen as the relief agencies absolving themselves of
responsibility. This critique has been addressed by others to have cautioned against the uncritical acceptance of resilience as a proxy variable or substitute for sustainability without considering the broader cultural and political economies (Bollig, 2014; Sudmeier-Rieux, 2014). Specifically referring to the movement toward self-sufficiency and integration within designated host communities without freedom of movement and other enabling environments, the focus and drive to resilience, self-sufficiency, and integration within designated host communities without freedom of movement generates:

notions of camps as more permanent spaces of settlement with the potential for developing community and entrepreneurial populations. In the process, refugees are reconstituted along the lines of the neoliberal subject, from passive recipients of aid to camp “residents” and resilient subjects. Refugees are now expected not only to withstand adversity but also to thrive by becoming empowered and involved in the management of camp life. We argue that this form of humanitarian assistance, however, is ultimately disempowering. It can encourage refugees and displaced persons to become resigned to settlement in the camp as a long-term way of life rather than a temporary solution to crisis, and to abandon calls for the recognition of refugee rights demanding political change and mobility, whether resettlement or return. (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p. 334)

While these critiques are acknowledged, the alternative model of protracted aid under severe logistical constraints in the absence of easing of restrictions is untenable. Rather, reconceptualization of self-sufficiency and resilience is needed to understand the complex interdependency of economic, social, political, cultural, and environmental factors that drive or hamper self-sufficiency and resilience.

Implications from Academic Studies for Future Program Design and Assessment

Most assessments rely on traditional mixed methodologies with more focus on quantitative surveys combined with qualitative structured and focus group interviews with key informants (usually relief officials and NGO workers), refugees, and other stakeholders, typically conducted by external agencies. As a result, the analysis is often superficial and based on self-reported or narrated data on material assets, certain forms of social and economic capital, and hopes/aspirations, with some (usually qualitative) data on social and institutional support networks. Given refugee and host suspicion of outsiders and most external enumerators’ lack of familiarity with local contexts, this is not surprising. However, such research, while easier and faster to accomplish, often misses key local and cultural factors. For durable and sustainable remedies to protracted refugee encampment and successful refugee host interaction, the CRRF approaches to data collection and analysis and subsequent implementation must include non-economic variables as equally important to economic variables and focus on the local context.
4. Summary Findings and Recommendations

There is a vast amount of work on protracted refugee situations, refugee encampments, and refugee economies when academic and non-academic work is compiled. Our analysis of the material suggests that despite the large quantity of data and findings, the siloing of the various projects leads to redundancy as opposed to complementarity. The focus on traditional mixed-methods approaches gives similar findings and leads to similar and usually generic recommendations based on advice to better supply, manage, and implement resources and projects. Our analysis of the findings of nonacademic studies reviewed here suggests that:

1. There is consensus that there exists significant dissonance across the relief world between policies aimed at integration, self-sufficiency, resilience enhancement of hosts and refugees, and the problems associated with successful programmatic implementation of these policies.

2. Lack of freedom of movement and economic activities are the primary barriers to refugee self-sufficiency and resilience.

3. Most studies hint at the siloing and redundancies in livelihood and other self-sufficiency and resilience enhancement programs conducted by different agencies and NGOs result in a multiplicity of programs afflicted by high levels of attrition and failure, but without major changes to ongoing or planned programming, despite feedback from Monitoring and Evaluation efforts.

4. Most studies observe that programming efforts by relief agencies acknowledge and try but fail to address the pre-existing gender, class, ethnic, and other inequities within refugee and host communities, ensuring that benefits of programming usually accrue to those with higher levels of social, economic, political, or cultural capital, and that the general inequities persist as unmet needs or gaps that particularly and negatively impact the vulnerable.

5. Most studies have reported various inequalities (social, economic, political, gender) within both refugee and host communities but rarely go deeper into the root causes for these inequalities, many of which predate the arrival of refugees and the establishment of these camps or settlements.

6. Despite some data on psychological and other stressors and shocks suffered by refugees and hosts (in impoverished and marginalized areas), there is no effort to understand how these factors might affect refugee and host responses to the programming efforts of the relief agencies.

7. Most areas with significant numbers of refugees, even in progressive countries such as Uganda or Rwanda, tend to be underdeveloped areas with low market penetration and with significant natural and infrastructural limitations on resilience and self-sufficiency and, ultimately, they have a level of economic growth that can sustain a larger integrated refugee-host population.
The review of the academic literature, on the other hand, suggests that these aforementioned complexities underlying the generation of self-sufficient and resilient integrated refugee-host communities are well known to both academics and the majority of relief workers and have been amply documented. But there is a severe dissonance between academic research and the policy-programming world, where the academic findings either suggest insurmountable complexities and uncertainty or serve as major critiques or even indictments of major relief institutions and the relief world in general. In both cases, either the focus on complexity or critique might be unwelcome to various relief stakeholders who are increasingly overwhelmed by the growing refugee crises under the constraints of donor fatigue and the additional burden of development-focused CRRF compliance for which most relief workers are not trained. Interestingly, both academic and non-academic studies typically generate recommendations that are overly general and cautionary, usually relegated to the level of advising policymakers to improve enabling conditions and reducing gaps and needs. These recommendations include:

1. Better coordination and communication between stakeholders including donors, relief and development agencies, host national and local governments, and local stakeholders and beneficiaries but usually without specific locally and regionally feasible suggestions on how to achieve this.

2. Better outreach and messaging to local beneficiaries and other local stakeholders about livelihood and other resilience-building programming and but without incorporating local cultural and traditional forums for easier exchange of information, needs, and services.

3. Enhancing local and regional labor and goods markets, and capital or credit granting facilities, usually by suggesting top-down infrastructural investment by government or agencies and/or external private partners but without considering or evaluating the potential role of local private sectors as partners.

4. Enhancing local beneficiary access to markets, capital, and credit by easing restrictions on refugee movement and employment/economic activities but largely focusing on formal market mechanisms while ignoring or minimizing the complex role played by the informal economy.

5. Addressing gender, social, political, and economic inequalities and inequities but primarily through top-down programming and formal educational and other outreach mechanisms, and largely ignoring the traditional and emergent cultural forces underlying the historicity, reproduction, reinforcement, and endurance of these inequities within and across the affected cultures.

6. Increased focus on evaluation, monitoring, and feedback-driven changes to programming, but with little or no discussion on the environmental and structural limitations posed by the physical and the social, economic, political, and cultural landscapes.

Academic recommendations tend to be even more general, focusing on the need for a large-scale systemic change and the need to further understand the complexity, both of which are beyond the abilities of any of the stakeholders involved.

In summary, most findings suggest that while interventions fail to achieve targeted goals, some interventions have greater measures of success, especially in the pilot phases. The private partnerships interventions such as the Equity Bank and Sanivation in Kenya or the Jordan Compact show a promising start. However, the majority of these interventions are in pilot phases and the efforts to scale up the
level of interventions are largely driven by the availability of subsidization by the relief agencies and donors and refugee interest, with lower or little reliance on host community interest.

The largest analytical gap we find in the literature is the focus on quantitative economic variables and a cursory analysis of qualitative and health data. This gap prevents us from understanding how cultural behaviors, social modes, and the impacts of shocks and stressors in either refugee camps or impoverished host settlements create dynamic recursive loops that might negatively impact both refugee and host communities' abilities to engage with external interventions. This is further hampered when engagement with recipient communities is done through random surveys or focus groups by external teams that rarely or never return and when the recipient communities feel survey fatigue, neglect, and anger.

We suggest that reconceptualizing self-sufficiency and resilience through deeper understanding of community and group engagement, cultural models of exchange and interaction, and the role of social networks and health would give better, locally and culturally appropriate, and regionally implementable data and analysis. This would require a long-term commitment from donors and relief agencies to develop such research frameworks that would incorporate both survey-based and ethnographic approaches, the latter which can explore these complexities and their outcomes in greater depth and bring the socio-emotional and political economic contexts of refugee–host economies to inform both data analysis and policy programming.

We also recommend an inter-agency project for pooling data, discussing ways to develop data complementarity, and meta-analysis of different studies using synthesis of big data and thick data meta-analyses. Big data approaches can combine various quantitative data sets obtained by the different studies to examine correlations between different variables and factors. Thick data can combine the narrative data sets from key informant and individual structured/semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions along with participant observations to examine cultural domains, consensus, differences, and underlying agendas, motivations, and actions of stakeholders and beneficiaries. The combined synthesis of big and thick data meta-analyses will give descriptive, explanatory, and even predictive frameworks that can help multiple donors, agencies, and other stakeholders in identifying infrastructural gaps, unmet needs, and projected growth potential as well as structural barriers to programming success.

In conclusion, the CRRF approach is a welcome step toward the growing problem of sustainable refugee/migrant settlement faced by donors, relief agencies, host nations and communities, and refugees/migrants themselves. The eight African signatory nations along with donors and other stakeholders have made variable but commendable progress toward the CRRF objectives, especially in easing the burden of hosting refugees and enhancing self-reliance for refugees and hosts through integration. While many gaps and challenges remain, positive steps have been taken at the national levels (policy and legal changes affecting refugee movement and employment, access to education and health). However, the bulk of changes remain at the top levels, with many challenges of coordination and commitment at the regional and local levels. These challenges emerge from the complex and interdependent intertwining of environmental social, economic, political, psychological, and cultural factors that determine daily lives and also the beneficiaries’ abilities to respond to external interventions and programming. Unless these complexities are understood and addressed, most external programming and interventions will likely not achieve their intended outcomes.
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According to UNHCR:

The current refugee and migrant flows have resulted in more than 70 million displaced people across the world, including 21 million official refugees. The vast majority of refugees are hosted by developing nation-states in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, with average stays ranging from a few years to decades. Until recently, the primary approach for refugee housing was the relief in humanitarian spaces model, wherein aid in the form of basic necessities covering food, shelter, clothing, health, and security is given to the refugees while they wait for repatriation and/or third country resettlement. This “refugee wait” usually takes place in encampment conditions, with restrictions on refugee mobility and employment. As such, this approach is increasingly being considered unsustainable for donor and host countries and even detrimental for refugees and host communities. This is especially true for protracted encampment, where refugees can live in camps, usually located in marginalized areas among impoverished and vulnerable host communities, receiving relief and aid for decades without any resolution in sight.

There are three primary resolutions of protracted refugee situations: repatriation, resettlement, and integration. Repatriation is considered as the best resolution for any refugee crises by donors and other relief-agencies/stakeholders, provided it is voluntary, safe, and sustainable. However, continuation of local and regional hostilities despite peace agreements or cessations, lack of infrastructure, livelihood support, etc., are significant barriers to safe and voluntary repatriation. Resettlement to a third country is the option most preferred by refugees themselves. However, this is not considered a viable solution for the majority of encamped refugees as it depends on political will and openness of recipient countries and lengthy bureaucratic processes. Very few refugees as a percentage receive resettlement to a third country. Integration, i.e., socio-economic integration built upon self-sufficient/reliant refugees and host communities are now being considered as the most viable and sustainable long-term solution or even an “end state” emerging from protracted encampment (Sanghi et al., 2016; see summary in Easton-Calabria & Omata, 2018).

In keeping with these developments and in response to the growing global refugee and migrant crises, on September 19, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. The New York Declaration, signed by 193 member states, commits the signatories to strengthen and enhance protection refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants under the general advisory mantle of UNHCR. In adopting the New York Declaration, Member states:

- expressed profound solidarity with those who are forced to flee
- reaffirmed their obligations to fully respect the human rights of refugees and migrants
- agreed that protecting refugees and supporting the countries that shelter them are shared international responsibilities and must be borne more equitably and predictably
- pledged robust support to those countries affected by large movements of refugees and migrants
- agreed upon the core elements of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
• agreed to work toward the adoption of a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration

In particular, the New York Declaration led to the development of the CRRF to be applied to large-scale movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations. The CRRF focuses on the “importance of supporting those countries and communities that host large number of refugees, [which tend to be lower income nations], promoting the inclusion of refugees in host communities, ensuring the involvement of development actors from an early stage, and developing a “whole-of-society” approach to refugee responses.” At the basis of CRRF is the tacit acknowledgment that the dominant paradigm of continuous relief-based encampment is unsustainable and detrimental for all stakeholders, the four key objectives are to:

1. Ease the pressures on host countries and communities.
2. Enhance refugee self-reliance.
3. Expand third-country solutions.
4. Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

Given the barriers to feasibility of both (#3) third country solutions and (#4) safe/dignified return, the development of the CRRF has focused primarily on (#1) easing pressure on host countries and communities, primarily through (#2) enhancing refugee self-reliance. The latter is especially crucial because it enables refugees to live lives of dignity and fulfilment, pursuing upward social and economic mobility, and having a greater choice in their residential, consumption, educational/professional development decision-making. With access to education and employment, refugees may build skills and become self-reliant, contributing to local economies and fueling the development of the communities hosting them. It is anticipated that such approaches that integrate refugee and host social economies will simultaneously boost upward socio-economic mobility/increased buying power of both refugees and hosts in both groups through enhanced focus on local and regional production and markets, while simultaneously reducing the resource expenditure by host and donor nations in refugee relief. Aiming for refugee self-sufficiency is also crucial for donor nations and groups and relief organizations given donor fatigue and the current crises where the current and project needs of relief organizations far outstrip and are expected to continue outpacing donation levels. This paradigmatic shift to greater self-sufficiency necessitates re-examination of the encampment model, and in particular, it calls for easing or removing restrictions on refugee residence, mobility, employment, and property ownership, as well as access to health, security, and educational opportunities. Core CRRF tenets are:

1. Refugees should be included in the communities from the very beginning.
2. Refugee camps should be the exceptions: temporary responses to emergencies
3. Refugees should thrive in the host countries, not just survive
4. Refugee protracted stay risks and dependence on humanitarian aid should be lowered.

It is understood by the various stakeholder groups and nations supporting the New York declaration that the key to successfully shifting the paradigm of refugee/migrant humanitarian action away from protracted encampment towards local integration and refugee/host self-reliance depends upon active and adaptive partnerships between UNHCR, host and donor governments, NGOs, refugees and other UN agencies, as well as the private sector, international financial institutions, and civil society, including think tanks, academia, and faith leaders.
Since the adoption of the declaration, UNHCR has been working with the signatories and all other actors and stakeholders “to develop and initiate the practical application of the CRRF in a number of countries. As of February 2018, the CRRF is formally applied in a dozen countries, including two regional contexts in Africa and Central America.” In addition to the CRRF, the New York Declaration calls upon the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to propose a “global compact on refugees” in his annual report to the United Nations General Assembly in 2018. The global compact on refugees, the first draft of which was released at the end of January 2018 and will undergo formal consultations with Member States until July 2018, builds on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and sets out practical measures that can be taken by a wide range of stakeholders to enhance international cooperation in response to large movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations, and to ensure a more equitable and predictable sharing of the burden and responsibility for providing protection to refugees. (UNHCR CRRF)

Under the CRRF approach, the most viable pathway to self-sufficiency for encamped refugees living in marginalized environments is through integration of refugees into their host communities and countries as actor-agents in the local, regional and national economies, societies, cultures, and ideally even within the political arena. While all signatory nations have agreed to the four CRRF objectives, both the New York Declaration and CRRF guidelines recognize the sovereign rights of the signatory host nations to devise, enact, and enforce laws determining the rights of refugees within their territories. These laws, often in stark opposition to both the CRRF and the 1951 Refugee Convention, determine access to residence, mobility, employment, property ownership, education, health, and other services and benefits afforded to citizens and legal residents of the host nations. However, most if not all signatory nations have moved toward CRRF compliance in recent years, but with great variation in the pace and type of changes. We summarize these in the following sections.

Global CRRF Implementation

Since the initial implementation of the CRRF in September 2016, a total number of 15 refugee hosting nation-states primarily in the Americas and Africa have “opted to apply the CRRF and related concepts” (UNHCR 2018). These include:

- Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama under the San Pedro Sula Declaration (2017) and linked Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y Soluciones (or Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework) (MIRPS) in the Americas
- Afghanistan, which joined the CRRF in July 2018 in line with the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR+) approach in Asia
- Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Somalia under IGAD, where member states have agreed to the Nairobi Declaration with the annexed Nairobi Comprehensive Plan of Action for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees (and the Djibouti Declaration on Regional Conference on Refugee Education in IGAD member States—known as the Djibouti Declaration) in Africa

These regional CRRF implementation agreements extend pre-existing regional commitments on the rights of refugees and those forcibly displaced, and provide a framework for regional support and accountability mechanisms as each signatory host nation progresses towards all four objectives of the
CRRF. In December 2018, UNHCR completed the first comprehensive review of CRRF implementation and impacts in these hosting nations (UNHCR, 2018). The key findings of this report were:

1. National ownership and leadership is the most critical factor driving the success of CRRF implementation. Here, the report clearly notes that while most CRRF signatory nations have made progress, there are significant variations in the pace and focus of this progress.

2. The CRRF approach and the wide-ranging partnerships across government, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs has facilitated a “whole of government” approach and provided a set of fora for multiple agencies to agree programs of work and strategies that link to government priorities. This has been particularly important in Uganda where the “whole of government” is linked to a “whole of society” approach, with the end goals of successfully integrating 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda by the end of 2020.

3. UNHCR staff who work on the CRRF have referenced the importance of taking a longitudinal view, cautioning that local and regional complexities and that national policy changes take time to both implement and to have positive post-implementation impact. There is also a greater focus on livelihoods, environmental, and protection programming beyond the immediate relief needs within relief agencies across these nations.

4. Many donor states have started taking longer-term perspectives on displacement; focusing on funding livelihoods and economic inclusion in programming that involves both host and refugee communities—thereby ensuring that development gains are shared across both communities.

5. There is a crucial need for close attention to the gaps between government policy and service delivery—often requiring a deeper analysis of policy implementation and structural and procedural issues in addition to legal and policy frameworks.

The UNHCR report breaks down the key progress made in each CRRF objective and are summarized here:

Objective One: Ease pressures on the host countries involved

- Donors have initiated numerous funding opportunities and initiatives to ease the financial pressure on host nations, either through individual donor nation’s own relief and development agencies or through partnerships with iNGOs and UN-affiliated bodies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and FAO.

- The international response has also led to the World Bank’s International Development Association Refugee and Local Community Sub-Window (IDA 18) that was initiated on July 1, 2017, to expand the availability of additional financial resources to CRRF countries. This has resulted in a fund of almost $2 billion available until 2020. UNHCR (2018) reports that over $370 million has been allocated to projects in three CRRF countries (Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda).

- Despite increasing interest in refugee economies by the private sector, progress on private sector engagement in CRRF countries is just emerging (see also IFC, 2018). The greatest successes observed have been in the development of policies enabling refugees to work legally. There are some interventions and plans for building industrial zones/parks and other jobs/livelihood schemes to provide jobs to both hosts and refugees—e.g., various private enterprises have shown a willingness to invest in businesses to benefit refugees and hosts.
through programs such as the Jordan Compact and Ethiopia’s Job Compact. In certain CRRF countries (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda), an increased focus on private-sector approaches for facilitating income opportunities for refugees and host communities and financial inclusion has been backed by studies of refugee economies and have drawn private-sector interest because of the potential gains from increased refugee participation in the local economy. There is a growing but yet untested and unverified consensus that refugee and host community incomes and livelihoods can be boosted through private-sector interventions either through offering salaried employment or better banking and credit access (see Case Study on Equity Bank programming in Kakuma Refugee Camp-Kenya: IFC, 2018).

- The gaps between traditional humanitarian and development financing are being addressed by CRRF signatory government through more inclusive planning and alignment with donor priorities and cycles and by donors recognizing and prioritizing greater coordination and closer harmonization between humanitarian and development actors in line with the World Humanitarian Summit's Agenda for Humanity. As part of the preparatory process for the design and implementation of programs to be financed under the IDA 18 refugee and local community sub-window, UNHCR and World Bank missions included a number of eligible CRRF countries within their overall coverage. A significant focus of this work has been the identification of socio-economic interventions in support of both local communities and refugees. The report affirms that the growing role of development partners and the private sector is critical to achieving objectives, while noting that humanitarian assistance will still remain a vital and central component of refugee responses.

- $175 million financing was allocated for refugee and local community projects in Djibouti, Uganda, and Ethiopia in conjunction with another World Bank sub-window (IDA 17), resources titled Development Response to Displacement Impacts Projects. A further $100 million was approved for DRDIP projects in Kenya and the Horn of Africa, targeting improvements in access to basic services, economic opportunities, and environmental management of refugee hosting communities.

- A full analysis on the impacts of CRRF on the efficacy or volume of funding is not possible due to limitations in data, in financial tracking mechanisms at the country-level, “siloed” humanitarian and development funding streams, and variation in donor cycles and disbursement patterns. Moreover, while examples of new donor-driven funding modalities may be highlighted, assessing impact is not possible due to the short time frame following implementation.

Objective Two: Enhance refugee self-reliance

- There have been positive policy shifts on refugee inclusion and self-reliance across both African and Central American CRRF countries as well as Mexico, with the majority of states making commitments toward continued inclusive approaches for refugees. Refugee-hosting states have committed to specific actions to enhance refugees’ self-reliance and to continue addressing legal and administrative barriers to greater socioeconomic participation.
  - In North and Central America and Mexico, the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (CRPSF, or MIRPS) seeks to operationalize long-standing commitments to forcibly displaced individuals through over 180 commitments at the state and regional levels and has brought further focus on the drivers of displacement.
In Africa, there has been increased focus on self-reliance and livelihood programming in all countries, especially Rwanda and Uganda that have formally eschewed the encampment model, a shift away from the encampment model in Djibouti and Ethiopia, and policy commitments at the regional and national levels in other countries such as Chad, Zambia, and Kenya on more inclusive refugee education and livelihoods strategies.

- Several states have intensified incorporation of refugees into planning processes through national and district development plans, and, in the case of Central America, through specific and detailed commitments. Greater inclusion in planning stages is a key element of the “whole of society” approach that is based on multiple stakeholders engaged at both the national and local level.

- Significant policy developments at the national level have occurred in countries that are applying the CRRF, to enable greater inclusion of refugees in national health, education and employment, and civil documentation systems. In key barrier areas such as freedom of movement for refugees and encampment, the progress is variable and driven by local laws that continue to enforce limitations for refugees and other forcibly displaced individuals, despite the projected reforms. There are also large gaps between “announced policy priorities, legal changes and implementation” that have not been addressed.

- Considerable progress has been made in policy changes away from detention toward greater inclusion of refugees into government welfare programs (MIRPS) and a gradual move from encampment toward greater freedom of movement in some African CRRF countries.

- A number of states have enacted or are in the process of enacting new refugee laws and regulations guaranteeing the rights of refugees and expanding refugee access to national systems and services.

- CRRF countries have agreed to improve identification, registration, and access to key documentation and to ensure greater recognition of refugee identification and rights by employers and service providers. Mexico has acted to ensure that bearers of the Permanent Resident Card are able to access financial services and jobs.

- As a whole, CRRF countries have eased some of the legal barriers to employment. Some CRRF countries have opened up access to unemployment and job readiness services and included refugees in national economic planning. Others are planning.

- In the MIRPS region, Panama has agreed to include refugees in vocational training programs, and Costa Rica is piloting a graduation approach that integrates refugees into national employment programs.

- Regarding African CRRF countries, Uganda continues to allow refugees to gain access to employment and land, and in Zambia, refugees have been given access to mobile wallets.

- Access to educational opportunities has been furthered by integrating refugee schools into the national educational systems, as well as enabling refugees to attend national educational institutions, as well as easier transferability of education qualifications.
Objective Three: Expand access to third-country solutions

- Most member states have demonstrated their commitment to resettlement and complementary pathways, especially for the most vulnerable refugee families. These include the utilization of innovative resettlement mechanisms such as the Protection Transfer Arrangement in Central America and expanding complementary pathways for admission. However, the upwards trends in resettlement seen until 2016 have now diminished with current resettlement figures closer to the 2008–2009 levels, given the political realities in many of the preferred resettlement nations.

Objective Four: Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity

- There have been fewer voluntary returns since 2016. This is indicative of challenges facing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, as well the long-term investment that is long-needed to ensure safe and sustainable return.

- In the African CRRF regions, the bulk of returns have been from Kenya to Somalia and between Chad and its neighboring nations. The Central American CRRF regions show very low levels of return.

- There are agreements relevant to both the Central American and African CRRF countries such as MIRPS and IGAD’s Road Map for Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Plan of Action that outline a plan for regional strengthening and ensuring refugee sending States’ recovery.
  - For Somalia specifically, this is supported by the IGAD, AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia, and other international actors focusing on improving the security context and to support activities in line with the Somalia National Development Plan that also recognizes the need for reintegration of former refugees in Somalia.
  - The MIRPS recognizes the impact of displacement cycles (displacement tied to cyclical occurrence of crisis) and the need to address root causes of displacement in Central America. It follows a regional perspective that considers origin, transience, and destinations in its approach and reaffirms the need for strengthening national protection mechanisms and state institutions.

- Afghanistan recently applied the CRRF in July 2018, and there is potential for synergy with the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR+) approach.

Key Conclusions of UNHCR Evaluations

1. Leveraging new financing approaches and instruments is essential in opening up more sustainable and effective funding for both developmental and humanitarian responses in support of both refugees and host communities—and to enhance host governments’ existing support to refugees.

2. A “whole of society” approach, as reflected in the CRRF, requires an investment of time and leadership by host governments to bring together diverse stakeholders and build a shared understanding. Factors such as leadership and political commitment from the highest levels of government, openness to policy reform, and international and multilateral agencies’ commitment to new ways of working all contribute to a contextually appropriate realization of CRRF.
3. There is a growing recognition of the potential social and economic contributions refugees can make in their host countries, when permitted to do so. A more inclusive policy and legal approach by hosting states supported by increased investment by development actors can generate development gains in key SDGs for host communities as well as refugees.

4. Against a 15-year trend of gradual and consistent increases in the numbers of individuals resettled (with annual fluctuations), 2017 and 2018 saw resettlement rates contract to a level slightly below the previous decade’s average. As part of the global commitment to more equitable and predictable responsibility sharing in the New York Declaration, member states expressed an intention to provide resettlement places and other legal pathways for admission on a scale to meet the annual needs identified by UNHCR. In this regard, the Emerging Resettlement Countries Joint Support Mechanism and the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative are important efforts seeking to expand not only the base of countries participating in resettlement schemes but also the pathways and number of places available. Data on access to and use of complementary pathways is limited and needs to be strengthened.

5. Addressing the root causes of forced displacement, including peacebuilding in countries of origin, represent the key challenge toward achieving Objective Four of the CRRF. This requires political investment and enhanced stabilization and development efforts from regional and international actors. Although limited voluntary returns occurred from 2016 to 2018 in CRRF countries, regional approaches to drivers of displacement and instability, such the MIRPS in Central America and IGAD’s Nairobi Declaration and Plan of Action on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees, are crucial in accelerating solutions in countries of origin.

6. There is evidence that greater focus on local as well as national structures would increase the effectiveness of the CRRF. Evidence from Kenya and Uganda demonstrate that local government structures play an important role in coordinating and leading refugee responses. For example, the Kakuma County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) 2013–2017 highlights the leadership role of local authorities in incorporating refugees in local planning.

CRRF in Africa

Focusing particularly on Africa, there are eight signatory countries to the CRRF, including Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Somalia. Of these, Uganda and Rwanda are well known for their progressive approaches to refugee-hosting that predate the CRRF model. The other CRRF signatories in East Africa have had much more restrictive laws regarding refugee mobility, residence, and rights to work and access to public services. However, all of these governments are working with international partners and relief organizations to change/adapt their legal system to comply with the objectives and agreements established in the New York Declaration and CRRF.

The pace and approach to CRRF implementation in these countries can be divided into three groups:

1) Accomplished Implementation and Adherence to CRRF, movement toward Integration: Rwanda and Uganda

Rwanda and (especially historically) Uganda have had the least restrictive policies on refugee rights to mobility, residence, employment, business activities, and all other rights enjoyed by the citizens of these
countries in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention and their own legal systems. As signatory to the 1951 Convention, the Government of Rwanda ensures the rights of work, primary education, and the right to move freely and is currently working on improving refugee access to markets, capital, and other opportunities. This shift is provided for under article 18 of the Law n°13ter/ 2014 of 21/05/2014 relating to refugees, which stipulates that “without prejudice to other laws, any person having obtained refugee status in Rwanda shall enjoy the rights and liberties provided for by international instruments on refugees ratified by Rwanda” (UNHCR-Rwanda). The Government of Rwanda ensures the rights of work and primary education and the right to move freely, and it is currently working on improving refugee access to markets, capital, and other opportunities.

However, despite these progressive legal changes, there are many gaps, especially in areas where refugees are concentrated, that tend to be underdeveloped, with limited or little market penetration, and both refugee host communities living at or near the subsistence level. According to The World Bank (2019), in Rwanda, the success of market modalities were largely limited to camps in areas with existing market infrastructure. Hence, while market-centered interventions were considered as feasible for successful interventions in Nyabihike, Gihenbe, and Kigeme camps, Kiziba and Mugombwa camps lacked the infrastructure to sustain external interventions. This is in line with other studies that suggest the need for pre-existing infrastructure for interventions, thereby limiting market modalities to local realities. The World Bank assessment of the potential for refugee inclusion in national development plans concluded that while feasible, massive infrastructural support was needed from external bodies and the Rwandan Government to implement meaningful and sustainable inclusion. Specifically, the report suggested embedding of responses within institutional systems of governance and finance, clear communication and coordination between local and regional and all other concerned actors in implementing multi-sectorial projects, technical and implementation by the World Bank, and adequate review of works design and plans by local and national agencies.

In Uganda, the legal system governing refugee rights has been more extensively studied (see Betts et al., 2014, 2017; Clements et al., 2016; Ilcan, 2018; Ilcan et al., 2017; UNHCR-World Bank, 2016), the “Uganda model” allows refugees to seek employment, business, agriculture, and other sustenance activities and the freedom to settle anywhere in the country. Uganda and Rwanda have hence a demonstrable lead in establishing alternative models for refugee-host community integration granting the aforementioned rights as well as access to government-provided health care and primary education. The more progressive approach to refugees has long been studied as a model for other host nations, in particular with The Settlement Transformative Agenda and the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategy that focuses on building refugee and host community self-reliance. The UNHCR-World Bank (2016) identified the primary barriers including: while primary education to refugees is free, secondary education is challenged due to funding gaps, and refugees with disabilities are negatively impacted by the self-reliance strategy, as they are often unable to find or are discriminated against in seeking gainful employment. The key recommendations were that oversight is required so that refugees can better coordinate and collaborate with host communities on economic activities, the ReHoPE strategy offers an opportunity to design a developmental approach that builds on past achievements and addresses challenges related to the Self Reliance Strategy and Development Assistance to Refugee-Hosting Areas program, and that programming should be informed by a deeper situational analysis of the nine refugee-hosting districts where the Settlement Transformative Agenda and ReHoPE will be implemented. Interventions have also produced some increase in access for refugees to education after the Government of Uganda launched the Education Response Plan in 2018, which outlines the steps and investment required for including an estimated 675,000 children into the country’s education structure.
While the UNHCR-World Bank Report did not focus on host communities, these findings were complemented and supplemented in a more recent study by FAO (2018) on food security, resilience, and well-being among refugees and hosts in Northern Uganda. Key findings were that commonalities between refugees and host communities provide a strong foundation for peaceful coexistence and development that refugees’ integration into the local formal economy is a long process but also that displacement and refugees’ arrival create opportunities for operating business enterprises. The study found that a vibrant informal market already exists between refugees and host communities, contributing to the resilience of both communities. However, refugee households are less resilient than households living in host communities, due to the uncertainty of refugee lives, and that the resilience of households in the host communities is mainly threatened by natural forces. The study also found a primary source of destabilization was potential conflict between hosts and refugees, especially when the refugees receive relief aid during emergencies that are denied to hosts, even when they face same shocks. Another source of conflict is access to education and employment opportunities that favor refugees over host communities (FAO, 2018).

2) Accomplished Changes in Legal Policies towards refugee movement and employment, progress toward integration: Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Zambia

In Chad, a National Refugee Law that eases restrictions has been submitted to the Council of Ministers in September 2018 and is being vetted by Parliament. However, UNHCR–Chad reports that “the application of the CRRF in 2018 enabled the integration of schools built by UNHCR in refugee camps into the national education system. The same process will be followed for health facilities.” Furthermore, in line with CRRF objectives, “following the influx of refugees from the CAR, UNHCR led the emergency response in the south of Chad. All individuals were registered and subsequently relocated to host villages (54 percent) and existing camps (46 percent), in line with the Government’s out-of-camp policy” (UNHCR-Chad, 2018). According to UNHCR (2018), under CRRF movement, refugees have been allowed to settle in host communities and in some areas granted access to arable land, however, freedom of movement can, in practice, be restricted until the new law is passed. Refugees may have functional access to land through customary negotiations but their long-term tenure may be limited. There is no specific reference to refugees’ right to work, but it is assumed under labor laws regarding the rights of foreign workers. There is no formal directive as yet, but there is “anecdotal evidence” that refugees can access government services.

In Djibouti, a new National Refugee Law came into force in 2017, and decrees were enacted that ensure the integration of refugees into national systems such as health, education, and the labor market. According to UNHCR (2018), there was a marked shift from the encampment-based policy under older law toward full freedom of movement under the new national refugee law, as well as access to land ownership, the right to work, and eligibility to access state services.

In Ethiopia, a new refugee law was passed in January 2019 that allows refugees to obtain work permits, access primary education, obtain drivers’ licenses, legally register life events such as births and marriages, and open up access to national financial services, such as banking. There have been 35,000 additional primary school enrolments among refugees in Ethiopia since 2016, and the Government of Ethiopia has affirmed its commitment to phasing out the camps gradually, with an initial target of integrating 10 percent of refugees into host settlements by the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2018).

In Zambia, the 1970 Refugee Control Act, there was an official encampment policy that restricted most refugees to settlements, limited the number allowed in urban areas, and criminalized those who move to
the city without required permissions. The 1970 law also limited refugees’ rights to elementary education and wage-earning work. However, as signatory to the CRRF, recent steps have included plans to relax the encampment policy and “provide more freedom of movement to refugees through a settlement approach, allocate a crop of land to every refugee household living in the settlements, and improve Refugees’ access to secondary and tertiary education through streamlining study permits for those wishing to attend school outside of the refugee settlements” (Global-CRRF-Zambia, 2018). The move to CRRF was followed by the new 2017 Refugee Act [that] provides for granting refugees access to territory and the provision of protection and identification of solutions. The new act represents a significant shift from the 1970 Refugee Control Act whereby the Government is taking steps to implement a settlement approach, granting refugees a variety of rights and access to services, such as right to property and access to justice and facilitating permanent residency or naturalization as alternative legal statuses” (Global-CRRF-Zambia, 2018).

3) Gradual Implementation of CRRF amidst political realities: Kenya and Somalia

The case of Kenya and Somalia are intertwined and discussed in the next section, where the specific political realities of refugee settlement for Kenya and refugee returns for Somalia are considered.

CRRF in Kenya

In 2016, the Kenyan government pledged as signatory of the CRRF:

To undertake several self-reliance and inclusion measures for refugees in Kenya, including support for the development of the Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement to benefit refugees and residents of Turkana County; facilitation of legal status for those refugees with legitimate claims to citizenship and/or residency in Kenya through marriage or parentage; and implementation of the Guidelines on Admission of Non-Citizens to Institutions of Basic Education and Training in Kenya, which will facilitate enrollment of refugees and other non-citizens in Kenyan schools. (UNHCR, 2016)

In March 2017, the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia was negotiated by IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development), the signatories being CRRF nations Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda, as well as Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan. The Nairobi Declaration committed the signatory nations to:

provide Somali refugees with economic opportunities in host states and calls on IGAD member states to enhance education, training, and skills development for refugees; align domestic laws and policies with the 1951 Refugee Convention; and advance alternative arrangements to refugee camps, facilitating the free movement of refugees. (IGAD, 2017)

These represented a shift in the Kenyan Government’s approach to refugee encampment in early 2016, which had called for a unilateral closure/voluntary repatriation of refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab camps and then only Dadaab Camp by mid-2016, citing national security concerns. This was a step away from the 2013 tripartite agreement between UNHCR, and the Kenyan and the Somali governments, following a decline in Al Shabaab activities in most parts of northern and coastal Somalia. Various activities including incentivizing voluntary return were carried out in Dadaab between 2016 and 2018, resulting in the return of around 80,000 refugees. In Somalia, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) initiated the project: Promoting Durable Solutions through Integrated Return, Reintegration and
Resilience Support to Somali Displacement Affected Populations aims to support conditions conducive for safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration of Somali refugees. The project was implemented between October 2016 and June 2017 by NRC and DRC.

A follow-up study on the Somali returnees suggests that most of these returnees consisted of female-headed households from the Digil-Mirifle clan and/or were Somali Bantu from Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, or Bay regions—regions with continuing Al Shabaab presence. Both groups have little or no political power and are largely living in IDP camps like urban settings in Mogadishu and Kismayo, where the term IDP has become a “code for a Somali from a low status group who is living in a city dominated by a more powerful clan and who is poor and squatting or renting in a slum” (DDG-UKAID, 2017). The study concluded that while the potential violent outcomes of a mass return of the Dadaab refugees to Somalia might be absorbed in the short term, over a longer term, “the return will intensify pressure on some very dangerous and unresolved fault-lines in Somalia, related to land, identity, rights, and demography.” The study also suggested a continued danger of potential radicalization of dissatisfied youth returnees by Al Shabaab (DDG-UKAID, 2017).

The study suggested that this situation might change following the May 2017 ruling by the Kenyan High Court that the restrictions on refugee freedom of movement and rights to seek employment or pursue other subsistence activities were unconstitutional and discriminatory. Accordingly, a bill was passed in Parliament to change the legal restrictions but was sent back to Parliament without being signed into a law. The Kenyan Government is still working with UNHCR and other stakeholders to change laws to move closer to the CRRF guidelines. A recent study by IRC (2018) on Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kakuma, and Nairobi confirms the DDG-UKAID findings and goes further to state that even with the proposed changes and drive toward self-reliance for Somali refugees as outlined in the Nairobi Declaration, there remain significant barriers, as the restrictions on the movement and employment of Somali refugees still remained in place at the time of the study. Furthermore, the findings suggest that most refugees are either unaware, are skeptical based on their own or others’ experiences, or are scared of acting upon their legal rights to seek employment even within the current Kenyan legal system under the:

Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011 [which] stipulates that a Class M work permit may be issued to a “Conventional Refugee” whether in gainful employment or voluntary service. By doing so, the Act affirms the right to work as an integral part of asylum in Kenya. The Act requires that refugees present documents including a letter of recognition from UNHCR; a letter from the prospective employer; copies of a valid national passport; passport-size photos and a recommendation from the Department of Refugee Affairs. (IRC, 2018, p. 13)

Beyond the legal restrictions, refugees and host communities, especially from Turkana and Garissa counties face significant bureaucratic hurdles and social/cultural discrimination based on ethnic identities. As reported, many refugees are often denied employment solely because they are refugees and hence lack key documentation that would enable them to get the Class M work permits. Furthermore, systems of patronage and corruption also form significant barriers for those who seek employment without the necessary political patronage or resources. As part of the ASALs, Kenyan Somalis of Garissa and the Turkana have long clashed with the central government, with tensions that extend into the colonial past. the Shifta War (1963-1967) between ethnic Somalis and the Government of Kenya, and the endemic ongoing Turkana conflict continue to inform both host communities’ responses to decades of official and targeted marginalization of the ASAL regions.